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A cryptographic hash function H takes as input an arbitrary-length message Ai, 
auo produces a fixed-length output called the hash value, or simply just the hash, 
H (AI). The hash acts as a COIIlIlli tment for the message itself, because it has 
some or all of the followillg properties (given in increasing order of strength): 
1. Preimaye resistance: It is easy to take a message Ai and compute the hash 
value H (Ai), but it is computationally infeasible to take a hash value h ano 
Lillel a lllCssagc 1'vl with H(Ai) = h. 
2. Second preimage resistance: Given a lIlessage Ai and its hash value H(NI), 
it is computationally infeasible to find a second message Ai' with the same 
hash H(A1) = H(Ai'). 
3. Collision n:sistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two messages 
AI and j\1' that have the same hash value (although of course, since the 
output space is finite and the input space is infinite, infinitely many such 
··collisiolls" exist). 
l\" ote that collisions in a hash function can alvvays be founo by brute force: If the 
hash fUllction produces all n-bit output ano one hashes about 2"/'2 mnoom mes-
sages, a birthday paradox argument shows that one can expect to find a collision. 
This attack callnot be avoided, except by makillg n large enough to prevent it 











160 bits is enough. Preirnages and second preimages can also be found by brute 
force: This is done by exhaustive search and requires an attacker to compute 
about 2" hash values. A hash function is considered to be "broken" if there is a 
method for finding collisions, preimages or second preimages faster than by brute 
force. 
Hash functions are an integral part of modem cryptography. They are used 
in applications such as digital signatures: rather than directly signing a message, 
the signer first hashes the message and then applies the signature to the (typically 
shorter) hash value. Clearly, if the hash function is not second preimage resistant, 
then an evil attacker Alice can take a message lvI signed by Bob, find another 
message 11.1' \vith the SeHne hash value, and claim that Bob signed lvI'. If the hash 
function is not collision resistant, t.hen Alice can find t.wo messages lvI and M', 
sign the first, 1\1, and later claim to have signed Af'. Hash functions are also used 
in conjunction with public-key algorithms for encryption, integrity checking and 
authentication. Bruce Schneier has been quoted as calling hash functions "the 
workhorse of modern cryptography" . 
Some history 
The implementation of a one-way function with a cryptographic purpose in mind 
was first suggested in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [DH7G], who proposed a way to 
use preimage resistant and second preimage resistant functions for the purpose 
of authentication. Diffie and Hellman did not use the term "hash function", and 
the functions mentioned in [DH76] did not necessarily need to be "compressing" 
in nature. The terrn hash function to imply a compressing, preimage resistant 
function is probably due to Merkle [Mer79] or Rabin [Rab78]. Neither l'vIerkle 
nor Rabin mentioned collision resistance, but its importance was soon pointed 
out by Yllval in [Yllv79]. 
At about the same time (i.e., around 1979), Rabin, Shamir and Adelman in-











to smface shortly after its publication, most notably the chosen message attacks 
bv Davida [Dav82] aud DeSllledt and Odlyzko [D086]. In the hope of preventiug 
such attacks, researchers suggested the use of hash functions (see [Den84] and 
[WiIl83]). (In addition to improving security, hash functions also made digital 
signat me schemes faster.) 
Contini et al. [CSPM07] note that for some time the precise notion of a hash 
function was disagreed upon by the academic comlIlunity. In [Den84], Denning re-
4uired that a hash function be preirnage resistant and second preimage resistant 
ouly: collision resistance was not mentioned. However, in [Win83], Wintemitz 
stated that hash functions had to be collision resistant if they were to be used 
ill digital signature schemes, yet in tum did not remark on the need for preirn-
age resistance. Contini et al. [CSPM07] propose the reason for this to be that 
many researches believed that collision resistance implied preimage resistance. 
Although true for hash functions used in prac:tice, this implication only holds 
uuder certain assumptions (the relationship between these two properties will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). 
Owing to the confusion ansmg from the use of many different hash function 
definitions, Preneel [Pre93] attempted to introduce some clarity: Drawing on the 
\\"ork of Rabin [Rab78], :Merkle [lVIer89] and Damgard [Dr89] he defined a une-
way hash functiun to be preiruage resistant and second preimage resistant, and 
a cullisiun resistant hash functiun to be preimage resistant, second preimage re-
sistant and collision resistant. Nowadays we consider the term "cryptographic 
hash function" to imply a compressing function that satisfies the three properties 
mentioned above, and consider a hash function to be ideal if the best possible 
way to foil collision resistance is by a birthday attack, and if the best possible 
way to foil both preimage and second preimage resistance is by brute force. 
{) ntil reccutly, hash functions have not received as much attention from the cryp-











ciphers. Intere~t in the topic suddenly flared after t he ingenious attacks of \,Tang 
et at. :WGLYO,l], [WY05] 011 MD4 [Riv92a] and r-.lD5 [l{iv92b] were unveiled at 
CHYPT0 1 in 2004. Sim;e then, cryptographers and cryptanalysts have started 
to pour energy into the construction of new hash functions, and into discovering 
the weaknesses present in the hash functions cunently used in practice. 
Increasing concern about the use of flawed hash functions in industry led the 
I\' ational Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)2 in late 2007 to launch 
a public competition for the development of a new cryptographic hash algorithm 
[NIS07]. The last time the NIST launched an endeavour of this nature was in 
1997; this colllpetition concerned the search for a new, unclassified and publicly 
disclosed encryption standard that could be used to protect government infonna-
tion. The need for this competition arose because the then current encryption 
standard, knowll as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [NIS99], was no longer 
secure against modem computing power. As a result of the competition, the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [NISOl] calUe into being. The hash algo-
ritlllll competition has been launched with a similar purpose in mind: The lllost 
c:Dulll1ouly used hash functions in industry, namely, MD5 [Riv92b] and SHA-O 
[NIS93], have been successfully attacked and thus need to be replaced. 
Iterated hash functions and generic attacks 
An ideal hash function would behave like a random oracle· all of the properties 
mentioned above would be satisfied. Unfortunately, in terms of implementation, 
the best we can do is to build hash functions that "appear" to be random, i.e., 
hash fUllctions are pseudo-random functions. l'vIost of the hash functions used 
in industry are built according to a design by Ralph Merkle [Mer89] and Ivan 
Dalllganl [Drt-59] cOlIlnlOuly known as the Med,;le-Damy(l,,.d constnu:tiun. The de-
sign makes use of an iterative procedure to process messages one block at a time. 
'\lessage blocks are processed by what is known as the cumpressiun functiun. 
lCHYPTO is all illtenmtiollal cryptology cOllferellce held anllually ill Sallta Barbara, Cali-
fomia. 











Starting with some pre-specified value and the first message block, the output of 
til<' first COlllj)l'cssion f1l11ction COIllplltatiOl1 together with the next message block 
forllls the iUPllt to t.he next l:ollljJressioll fUllctioll computation, awl so OIl. We re-
fer to hash fUlll:tions La.sed Oll this design as itemted CT'yptogmphic hash functions. 
In 1989 both l'vlerkle [!vler89] and Damgaxcl [Dr89] proved that if no collision 
l:ould Le found in the compression fundion, then no wllisioll could be found in 
the hash function. However, this leaves open the question of what would happen 
if a collision in the compression function could be obtained. As it turns out, find-
ing a l:ollision in the l:ompression function allows one to attack the hash function 
in a variety of ullexpected ways. This means that the Merkle-DalIlg~trdl:OllstrUl:­
tiOll itself is prane to weaknesses and hash fund ions based OIl this l:OIlstructioIl 
cannot Le as secme as was previously hoped. 
We rdpr to the attacks that highlight the weaknesses of the Merkle-Damgard 
coustrudion as generic attacks. These attacks are applil:able to all iterated hash 
functions. They do not exploit the Haws of a particular compression function, but 
simply treat the cOlllpression fuudion as a black box. The attacks by Wang et at. 
[WY05] (sometimes referred to as the Chinese attacks) are not generic attacks. 
They attack a specific family of hash functions, namely the :\lD hash function 
family, by exploiting Haws in the design of hash functions belonging to this family. 
It is in some ways surprising that the genenc attacks only started to surface 
after the Chinese attacks; for instance the very simple and elegant generic multi-
collision attack by Joux [Jou04] was only published in 2004. This indicates that 
until now, hash fUIlctions have not been as well studied as other cryptographic 
primitives, and that hash function research is in fact still in its infancy. The 
lise of hash fuuctiolls as part of cryptographic schemes Wrl,'i suggested as early 













In this dissertation we collect the generic attacks on iterated hash functions and 
describe them in detail. In other words, we focus our attention on what can be 
done by an attacker who can find a collision in the compression function. The 
rl'lllainder of the thesis is organiz;ed as follows: In Chapter 2 we introduce the 
mathelllatical tools that will be used throughout the thesis. In Chapter 3 we 
formally define cryptographic hash functions and discuss the properties desirable 
in such hash functions, as well as the uses of hash functions in cryptography. In 
Chapter 4 we discuss the Merkle-Damgard construction for hash functions and 
describe 1\104 [Riv92a] as an example of the use of the construction in practice. 
Chapter 4 also includes a description of our toy hash function, BABI. In Chapter 
5 we describe attacks that are applicable to all hash functions, and in Chapter 
6 we present the known generic attacks on iterated hash functions. Owing to 
these inherent weaknesses in the classical Merkle-Dalllgard construction, several 
variations of the construction have been suggested in the hope of improving its 
s(,("lll"ity. In Chapter 7 we describe SOIlle of these YIcrklc-Dalllg~ird variants and 












Probability Theory and 
Mathematical Tools 
This chapter collects results from probability theory, as well as other relevant 
brauches of mathematics, that will be important to the generic attacks described 
ill Chapters 5, (j and 7. 
2.1 Obtaining a particular result in k trials 
Suppose we have an urn containing m balls labeled 1 to m. We draw k balls out 
of the urn at random and with replacement. What is the probability of drawing 
a particular ball? (This is equivalent to the probability of throwing a particular 
number at least once if we roll an m-sided dice k times). The probability of 
drawing that particular ball each time is ~, so the probability of nut drawing it 
in k attelllPts is 
q(k) = (1 _ ~)k , 
Tn 
and hence the probability of drawing it at least once is 
p(k) = 1 -q(k) = 1 _ (1 _ ~)k 
In 











If J:r:J is small, then the terms ;;~, ;~~, ... become negligible and 
(2.1) 
So if k « m we can replace 1 - l by c - ~ (we need rn to be large and k to be ", 
small in order to USl~ the Taylor approximation, so that we are not approximating 
too many times) to get 
In particular, if k = Tn (i.e., the number of trials is the same as the number of 
balls in the urn) we get 
p(k) ~ 1 - e-1 ~ 63%. 
This is relevant for example when we consider the probability of obtaining a 
particular n-bit hash value (out of the m = 2" possible hash values) by hashing 
k = 2" random messages. Alternatively, we can fiud the value of k for which the 
probability of drawing a particular ball is p: then c-~ ~ 1- p, so _!i... ~ In 1 - p, 
'" 
or 
k ~ mIll (_1_). 
1-p 
So for a success probability of i we need about rn In 2 = O.69m trials. 
2.2 The birthday problem 
The birthday problem can be stated as follo\vs: Within a group of k people, what 
is the probability that two or more will share a birthday? For k = 23, two people 
will share the same birthday with probability just greater than ~. This appears to 
be somewhat counter-intuitive 1 , but within a group of twenty-three people there 
are C23 ) = 253 unordered pairs, each serving as a suitable candidate for a match. 
It now seems more likely that of the 365 days available in a year, at least one of 
the 253 pairs could possibly be two people sharing the same birth-date. 
1 Due to the coulltel'-intuitive llature of this result, the birthday problem is abo cOlInIlollly 












When computillg the probability that in a room full of k people at least two 
have the same birthday, we disregard allY factors that Ulay cause variations ill 
the distributioll, such as leap years, and we assume that all 365 possible birth-
elates are equally likely. 
We start by caiclllntiug the probability that all k birthdays are different, Le. 
that 110 two people share the same birthday. We call this probability q(k). The 
first person could have any of the 365 possible birthdays. The probability that the 
second person has a different birthday to the first is (1 - :it5). The probability 
that the third person has a different hirthday to the first awl second is (1 - 3~;:J 
We contiuue in a silllilar fashion and if k ::; 365, then 
k-1 . 
(j(k) = IT (1- 3~5)· 
1=() 
Thus, the proba.bility that at least two people share the same birth-date is 
p(k) = 1 -q(k) = 1 _ kIT-1 (1 __ i ). . 365 
!=() 
For k = 23, p(k) is roughly 50.7%. 
Using approximations 
\Ve now generali;r.e the settillg and rephrase the problelll in terms of urns and 
balls: Consider an mn containing In balls labeled 1 to Tn. We draw k balls out 
of the urn with replacement. What is the probability of obtaining a ·'collision", 
i.e., of drawing the same ball twice'! An argument similar to the one above shows 
that this probability is given by 















J)(k) = 1 -II (1 -~) 
'In 
i~() . 
( 1)( 2) ( 1,;-1) =1-1 1-- 1-- ... 1--'In 'In m 
and if k « m (i.e., !£. is small), we cau again use equation (2.1) to replace each 
'1/ 
(1 - i...) bv e -'2 to obtain Ttl '-' 
-I -" -(k-I) 
jJ(k) ::::::: 1 - em . em ... e-"'-
-k(k-I) 
== 1 - c--:r;;;-
Wlwll k = .jm, this is 1 - c-~ ::::::: ~i9%. 
(2.2) 
Putting it another way, we get n eollision with probability p when e ;~: = 1 - p, 
i.e., wheu the munber of balls drawu is 
k::::::: 21n (_1_) Tn. 
I-p 
(2.3) 
So the collisiou probability is & when k = J21n 2 ·m = 1. 18Jffi. That is, if we 
draw 1.18.jm balls (with replaeemeut) out of au urn eontailliug In balls, we have 
a 50% ehance of drawing the same ball at least twice. Iu the ease of the birthday 
problem, we set rn = 365. Hence, 
J~ ::::::: 1.2J365 ::::::: 22.93 ::::::: 23. 
This is relevant for example when we eonsider the probability of obtainillg the 
same /i- bit hash value twice when we hash I,; = 211 /'2 raudom messages. 
2.3 Multicollisions 
We now consider the probability of drawing the same ball r times in k tries. 











We are interested in tlw probability that some r people have the same birthday 
(we will call this event an r-collision). The details are now lIlore complicated, 
bllt it turllS OLit that if k =m(f'-l)/r = -14;-, then there is a high probability of 
Inl/f" 
at least,. people haviug the same birthday; we give a heuristie argument for this 
elailll. 
There are e) = k(k-ll',:~k-f'+ll unordered subsets of r people in the room, each of 
wldeh has a probability (1..)1'-1 of being an r-collision, i.e., of all r people having 
III 
the same birthday. If these probabilities were independent, then the probability 
of there being at least one r-eollision would be 
( 1) (;) p(k,r) = 1- 1- -.-.-rn,-l 
I (k) If k « If/ then by equation 2.2 this is approximately 1 - e -~ r , which indeed 
reduees to om earlier birthday problem approximation of 1 - e -!1~,~1) if r = 2. 
:'\ow note that if r « k (i.e., the number of people in the Ulultieollision we 
are looking for is much smaller than the number of people in the roOlll) then 
e) ~ ~'.;, and the probability of an r-collision is 
(2.4) 
If k = IIL(r-J)/,., then equation (2.4) gives 
p(m(r-Il/r, r) ~ 1 _ e ~!l. (2.5) 






~ In(l - p), 











In particular, an r-collision occurs with probability fJ = ~ if the ll\uuber of people 
IS 
(2.6) 
(RemelJ1ber, however, that this argument is heuristic, since the probabilities of 
(~ach subset of r people all lwviug the salIle birthday ttl·e not really iuciepeudent.) 
2.4 The birthday problem for collisions between 
two sets 
We now consider the problem of obtaining a shared birthday oetween two different 
groups of people, as opposed to obtainiug a shared birthday within one group of 
people. Consider a group of kl men and a group of k'2 women. What is the 
probability of at least one man and one woman sharing a birthday? (Shared 
birthdays within each gender group do not concern us). Again, we reformulate 
the problem in tenns of UrIlS and balls: Consider two urus, each containiug In balls 
llumbered from 1 to fIL. We randomly draw kl balls out of the first urn and k'2 balls 
out of the second Ul"ll, each time recording the number. What is the probability 
of the same llllluber occurring iu both lists? As pointed out by Nishiwma and 
Sibuya in [NS90] there are actually three distinct cases to consider: the case in 
\vhich both sets of balls are drawn without replacement, the case in which one set 
of balls is drawn without replacement and the other is drawn with replacement, 
awl the case iu which both sets of balls are drawn with replacelllent. We refer 
to these three cases as I\lodel A, Model B and Model C respectively (Model C 
corresponds to the scenario involving men and women given above). 
2.4.1 Model A 
\Ve consider the case in which balls are drawn from both urns without replacement 
(i.e., we are assured that there are no collisions within the two sets of drawn balls). 
Let q(k1 , k2 ) be the probability that there are no matches between the sets of balls 











first um with01lt replacement, the probability that the first ball drawn from the 
s('('oud mil is different to all the Imlls in the first sd is 1 - !<J.. (lJecause of the In 
'" 
possible lllllUbcl's that can be drawll, k1 are bad). Since the balls are also drawn 
without l'eplncenlUnt from the second um, the prolmbility that the secoud ball 
drawn from uru two is different to an" of the balls in the first set is 1 - .l:L..) 
J Ut-
(because there are In - 1 possibilities for the ball drawn out of the second urn, 
kl of which are bad). Continuing, we obtain 
Rearranging and dividing numerator and denominator by Tn gives 
k,,-1 ( k) TIk.'~-) (1 _ kl+i) Om - i - '1 
( 1 ') II 1=0 m (} ,..: 1 ,"':'2 = " = I.; 1 . 
11 ''2- (1 i ) i",,[) III. - /. /=[) - -;;; 
ThllS, 
1.;'2' ') b ( .) k1 + l ° l 
III (1(k" k·2) = '"', III (1 - -- - '"' In 1 - - . ~ n L....J In 
1=0 i=O 
We HOW consider the Taylor expansion of In( 1 - :E): 
x:2 x:3 
In(l - x) = -x - - - - - ..... 
2 3 
If 1:1:1 is small, then the terms ";, J~:J, ..• become negligible and 
lu(l - x) :;:::j -x. 




2The value of kl hfl~ to be sianifirantly smaller t.han In for us to replace each 111 (1 - .1-) by 
M • 'frt " 
~: ' awl h:2 has to be sigllificantly smaller thall /11 or the cumulative effect of approximating k2 











and the probability of there being a match between the first and second set 
~ of dnnvn balls is approximately 1 - e- "'. When k1 = k'2 = Vm this is 
1 - e- 1 = 63%. 
Putting it another way, \VC get a collisiou with probability p when e-~ = 1 - p, 
i.e., when 
k1k2 = mIn (_1_) . 
1-p 
So the collision probability is ~ when kl k'2 = min 2 :::::; O.69m. 
2.4.2 Model B 
This is a mixed model in which the balls are drawn without replacement from 
the first urn, and with replacement from the second urn. The balls drawn out of 
th~ first urn ('ompris~ kl of m possible balls. Since each ball is drawn out of the 
second lim with replacement, each has an independent probability !£l. of being 
111 
idrntical to a ball drawn out of the first urn. Since k'2 balls are drawn from the 
second urn, the probability of no balls in the first set being identical to any in 
the second is 
using e4uatiou (2.1), we replace 1 - x with e-x , and if kl + k2 «Tn, then 
Thus the probability of finding a match between the two sets of drawn balls is 
~ again approximately 1 - em. 
2.4.3 Model C 
\Ve now consider the case in which balls are drawn from both urns with replace-
ment, i.e., collisions withiu both sets of balls drawn are possible. Model C will be 











Tllis case is lllore complicated than the previous two cases (because of the pos-
sibility of collisions within both sets, which makes thelll effedively smaller when 
collsidering collisions between them), but we can work out an exact expression 
for the collisioll probability. Let 8'2(n, t) denote the number of ways in which au 
n-element set can be pmtitiolled into t nonelllpty subsets (this is called a Stirling 
number of the second kind, see [Pre93] and [GKP98]). We first note that if 1'1 is 
the Humber of distinct balls drawn out of the first urn in kl tries, then 
(To se(~ t his, note that T) is analogolls to the number of distinct birthdays aUlong 
the men. There are 82(k), td ways in which kl lllen can be divided into tl 
subsets who share the salllC birthday, and there are m(m - 1) ... (m - tl + 1) 
ways ill which distinct birthdays can be assigned to these tl subsets. Hcnce in 
82 (kl' t)) . m.( /I/, - 1) ... (m - t I + 1) of the possible mkl outcomes, the lllllllber of 
distinct birthdays is t).) A silllilar expression holds for the second urn. It follows 
that the probability of there being no collision between the two sets of balls is 
This is because the probability of tl distinct balls being drawn from the first urn in 
kl tries is ~8A kl' t d .rn(rn -1) ... (rn -tl + 1), the probability of t2 distinct balls 
being drawn from the second urn in k2 tries is ;;},;82(k2' t2) .m(m-1)· .. (m-t2+ 
1). and the probability that nOlle of the t2 balls from the second urn has the same 
number as allY of the t balls froUl the first urn is ("'-II) (",-1-1 1 ) ••• ('I/-t~+I-II). 
< 1 '" ",-1 rn-t~+1 
Retuming now to the problem at hand, the probability of at least one colli-
sion occurrillg between the two sets is p(k), k2 ) = 1 - 11(k1 , k'2)' The asymptotic 
3llalysis is much harder here than in the other cases, but it is shown in [NS88] 
that for large values ofrn and k1k2 ~ 'In we again have 
~ p( k ) ~ 1 - e - '" . (2.11) 
Of course, it is not surprisillg that if kl + k2 « m then all three cases result in 











occulTing withill eithm of the sets becomes negligible, so whether we me snlllpliug 
\vit.h or without replac:ellleut oeeollles irrelevant. 
2.5 The geometric distribution 
\Vc briefly introduce the geometric distribution. 
Definition 2.5.1. We define n Bernoulli trial to be an experiment that can result 
in unly one uf twu uutcomes, 'success' ur 'fail-UTe '. 
Definition 2.5.2. The geometric di::drilmtion is a discrete pmbability distribution 
describing the number uf iJernoulli tr·ials needed to ubtain une success. 
If jJ represents the probability of suceess in each trial then the probability of the 
first Sllccess uccurriug un the kth trial is 
p(k) = Prob(k - 1 failures and then one success) 
= (1 - p)k-lp. 
In the ehapters to come, we will be eoncerued with how many trials, on average, 
we Ileed to cOIlsider before we obtain a 'suecess'. This is given by t.he expected 
value of a geolllet.rically distributed randolll variable k, denoted E(K). We derive 
the forllluia for .8(K): 
E(K) = I: jp(j) = I: j(1 - p)j-lp . 
j=1 j=1 
We note that the series L:~l jx j - 1 is the derivative with respect to x of the series 
,--00 x j and therefore converges to .!!:.... (2.....) = _1_._. if Ixl < 1. We therefore ~J=1 ' d:c 1-:r (1-:(")2 
have 
E ( K) = p C 1 _ (11 _ p)) '2 ) = ~. 
Consider the following example: Suppose that in a set of ten balls, four are black 
and six are white. Assume that all of the balls are plac:ed in an opaque um and 
tha.t it. is impossible to tell white balls from black balls whilst the balls are in the 











of the lIUl before we obtaill a black ball. 
The probability 1) of it mudolllly drawn ball beillg blaek is 4/10 = 0.4. The 
!lumber of tria.ls before drawing a black ball fullows a geometric distri bution. We 
therefore expect, ou average, to draw 
1 1 
- = - = 2.5 
p 0.4 
balls before obtaiuiug a black ball. 
2.6 Random functions and cycles 
A m.ndorll functiun f : D ----t R maps an element of the domain, D, to a ra.ndomly 
selected elemeut of the range, R. A trllly random fUllction essentially needs to 
be described by a look-up table if it had a short description t.hen it wouldn't 
be randolll - which is inefficient if the domain is large. So in pra.ctice one uses 
/l:>(;udu-mndmTl. fuuctiolls. These are functions which elllulate randoUl functiolls; 
that is, evell though they have a short desc:ription their outputs ;'look ralldolll" . 
In this section we briefly discuss the behaviour of a pseudo-random function it-
erated llluitiple times (i.e., the function is iterated with itself). 
Let f : S ----t S h(~ it pseudo-random function on it finite set S of cardinality 
rn. For au initial value ;to E S' we define a sequence of elements of S by 
for i = 1,2, .... Since S is it finite set, the sequence of Xi'S lllllst eventually start 
to cyde. By the birthday paradox argument, the expected number of inputs 
that !leed to be considered before this happeus is O( yfm) (see Sectiou :.2.2). The 
dlO Illethod derives its nallle from the fact that the shave of the path 'walked' 
through the sequel1Cl~ resembles the Greek letter rho. In figure 2.1 the tail (the 
sectiou of the sequence before the cyde) has length two, and the cycle has lellgth 
six. (In later chapters we use 11 and ). to denote the cycle length aud tail length 











fi(:r:) = .e(:r) = w, SHY, but r- 1(;r) :f f,i-l(J:), we have two different preilllages 
for wand hence have fOllnd t1 collision. 
:r:!) :}; ltl 
:r;J -- .r.1 
/ \ 
Til :£'2 :r:" x 11 
/. \ / 
:£1 :1:7 -- X(j 
/ ;);13 ;Cl'2 
Xo 
Figure 2.1: Cycle of length six with a tail of length two 
2.7 Sequences and partial Orders 
III this sectioll we present dcfillitions Hmi concepts fWl11 [NS04], to be used in 
Chapter 7. We stick lllainly to the notation used by the authors of the said 
publications. 
Definition 2.7.1. Let 0: = (0:1, CY2, ... ,a,,) be a fixed, finite sequence of symbols 
!;lLch that each !;ym,bul is an elem,ent uf the symbul set S = {1, 2, . , , , l}, and such 
that each !)ymbul in S uccur'!) at least unce in 0:, 
The length of a is s and is denoted 10:1, For 1 :::; i :::; j :::; lal, we let ali, j] 
denote the subsequence of consecutive tenns (Qi' Qi+l,.,., O:j), and we call this 
an interval of the sequence 0:, A sequence interval of the forlIl 0:[1, j] is kuown as 
all initial intervaL 
A relatioll --< on S, associated with the sequence 0:, is defined as follows: 
Definition 2.7.2. For J;, yES, 1: --< y if every UCCUT'T'CnCe uf:£ precedes every 











The relatioll above is (llltisYllllllctric and transitive and thus is a JlaT'tial order, 
Two elements J: and y of S are said to be incornpumble if x I< y nud y I< x, A 
list of sYIIlGols Xl, :;;'2, ' , , ,:rt sllch that :1:1 -< X2 -< ' .. -< Xt is kllOWU as it chain of 
leugth t. A set of chains is a c:hain decornpostion of X if the chains are disjoint 
and their uuion is X (i.e., if every element of X appears ill exactly oue of the 
cha.ins). There is a classical result called Dilworth's Theorem which applies to 
any partial oreler: 
Theorem 2.7.1. Suppose that -< is (/. pari.ial ordFr 011 a finitF set X. Then 
the 'lfwximum numbe'/' of mutually incompamble elements in X is equal to the 
rmnirllum nmniJer- of chains in any c:/tain decomposition of (X, -<). 
vVe denote the leugth of the lougest chain in 0: by waxchaill( 0:). Note that if 
there are t elements which occur exactly ouce ill a, then maxchaill(a) ~ t. 
For it sYlllGol xES, we oefille the frequeucy of x to be the Il\\luber of times 
J: appears iu the sequence 0:, i.e., 
freq(x) = I{i : O'i = x}l· 
\V(' ridillc the fr'equenc:y of the sequence (y to be 
freq(a) = mux{freq(x) : ;1: E S}, 
i.e., the lllunGer of occurrences of the most popular symbol in 0:. 
We now give SCHue examples to help illustrate the notions discussed above. Some 
of these sequeuces will be refened to i:l,gain in Chapter 7. 
Example 1. I ,t \l,(I,l) ~- (1 2 i) .JC' ':l' - ""',. In this example we have the chain 
1 -< '2 -< '" -< l, and maxchain(l];(l,I)) = t. 
Example 2. Lct 1];(2,1) = (1,2, ... , l, 1,2, ... , I). There IS no chain of leugth 











Example 3. Let {el : l = 1,2, ... } be a family of sequences defined itera-
tivclV in snch a wa~' that (0 1 = (1, 1), 8 2 = (1, 2, 1, 2) a11(1 8 1+1 is obtained from 
E-)' by replacing the final element l in Sl by l + 1, l, l + 1. (So Sl has length 2l 
and every elellwnt in {I, 2, ... , l} appears twice.) For instance, 
e 3 (1,2,1,3,2,3), 
e 4 (1,2,1,3,2,4,3,4), and 
e 5 (1,2,1,3,2,4,3,5,4,5). 
So with respect to the sequence e l , the lists 1 -< 3 -< 5 -< ... -< l (if l is odd), 
or 1 -< 3 -< 5 -< ... -< l - 1 (if l is even) are chains (all occurrences of 1 appear 
before all occurrences of 3, which occur before all occurrences of 5, etc). 
From the above it is evident that maxchain(el ) 2: lltl J. In fact, maxchain(e l ) = 
l't 1 J. For any lit 1 J + 1 elements from S = {I, ... , l}, there appear two consec-
utive elements i, i + 1 of S by application of the pigeonhole principle. But, due 
to the nature of the construction of e l , it contains a subsequence (i, i + 1, i), and 
thus the ll~l J + 1 elements cannot form a chain. 
2.8 Square-free and abelian square-free sequences 
In this section \ve introduce concepts and notation surrounding square-free words 
and sequences. \;\Te are particularly interested in abelian square-free sequences 
since they will be of use to us in Chapter 7. We stick mainly to the notation used 
by Rivest and Andreeva et al. in [Riv05] and [ABF+08] respectively. 
A word:,;) is a sequence of letters, finite or infinite, over some finite alphabet 
A. A word may be denoted w = abc where Cl, band c are elements of A. If a word 
can be written in the form w = :cvz where x,v and z are words, with V nonempty, 
then x is known as a prefi;c of w, z is known as a suffix, and y is known as a factur 
(or subword) of w; the words x and z may be empty. We let Facta(l) denote the 











2.8.1 Square-free words and sequences 
Definition 2.8.1. A wOld w is a Slju,an, if it can be written in the furm w = x:r 
with ;r lL(}'I/,(;fllply and finite. 
A word w is said to be Sljll(m;-free if it contains no repeated, adjacent letters or 
subwords, More f01'lllally: 
Definition 2.8.2. A wurd w is square-free if it cuntains nu facturs uf the form 
/},I} whae y is finite lind nonempty, 
III c\ ticqucncc cOllsititillg of lettcrs ovcr a binary alphabet, one willllot DnJ squarc-
free wurds uf lellgth greater than three (since we are nut allowed repeated as or 
Is, the ouly square-free words of leugth three are 010 and 101; but adding 1 or 0 
respectively to these wurds gives a repeated subword 01 01' 10), However, if the 
alphalwt is in('r(~Hsed by just. one symbol, an infinite square-free sequence can be 
generated, namely, 
Il= 210201210120210201202101210201210120", 
This sequence was first exhibit.cJ by Alex Time in 1906 [Ber95]. We will need 
inDnite square-free sequences that can be generated using a small alphabet when 
we discuss dithered hash fUIlctions in Chapter 7, 
2.8.2 Abelian square-free words and sequences 
Definition 2.8.3. A word w is said to be an abelian square if it can be written 
in the fU1'7lL w = :1::r' wher'e :1:' is a permutatiun uf x, 
Definition 2.8.4. A word w is abelian square-free if it contains no factur's uf the 
fU7'711 yy' where /} i8 finite and nonernpty, and where y' is a permutatiun uf y, 
The notion of being abelian square-free is stronger than that of being square-free, 
If a word or a sequence is abelian square-free, theu it is automatically square-free 











Pleasallts [Pk70j proved that infillite ahelian square-free words exist over a five-
lctt(~r alphabet. and in 1992 Vcikko Kcriill<m [Ker92] produced an illfilJitc abelian 
square-free sequence OVl~r (I, four-letter alphabet, nalllely, 
~ = abcacdcbcdcadcdbdabacabadbabcbdbcba ... 
For the remainder of this dissertation we refer to this sequence as the K eTanen 
IWjuence. Further details relating to the generation of this sequence can be found 
in [Ker03] a!ld [Riv05]. 
2.9 A note on big-oh notation and complexity 
Owillg to the fact that we make use of big-oh notation in some sections of this 
dissertation, we fOl'lllally introduce it here: 
Definition 2.9.1. Let f : JR( -t JR( be a function. For n E N and for an arbitmr-y 
Iwl culJ,ljtant c we define the following: 
1. OU):= {.II: JR( -t JR(I (:3c) (Vn)g(n) :S cf(n) + c}. 
Th'ilj is the cluss of all functions which grow mOTe slowly than, or' just as fa...,t 
as. f. An equivalent definition yields OU) := {.II: JR( -t lRl(:3c)(:3no)(Vn 2.:: 
no)y(n) :S cf(n)}. 
2. oU) := {.II: JR( -t JR(I (Vc) (:3k)(Vn 2.:: k)cy(n) + c :S f(n)}. 
This is the class of functionlj which ymw IjtTictly mOTe Ijlowly thun f. 
3. O(f) := {y : JR( -t JR(lf E O(g)}. 
This ilj the class of functions which ymw faster' than, aT' just a..., fa...,t as, f. 
4· A(f) = 0U) n O(f). 
This is the cla...,,, of functions which have the same growth mte (l.S f. 
The lllost informative measure of the complexity of an algorithm is how long it 
l'LlllS, i::1S a function of the siz;e of the input in bits. In the ca.se of hash fundions, we 
usually defi.uc the time complexity as the !lulllber of calls tu the the cOlllpression 
fUllction. We are usually interested ill the average-case complexity although it is 












Hash Function Basics 
Iu this chapter we define hash fUllctiolls auel descriLe the propcrtics they lleed 
for security, aud how they are llsed iu cryptography. 
3.1 What is a hash function? 
A hash fuuction is a function 
H: {O, 1}= --'f {O, 1}I! 
where n E N, that is, a function that compresses an input of arbitrary length to 
an output of fixed length l . We refer to the output of a hash fuuctiou as a hash 
value, or simply just a hash. 
Historically, the term hash function originat~s from th~ field of compl1t~r SCI-
euce. Cryptographic hash functions and conventional hash functions are related 
ill the sense that they both map arbitrary-length inputs to fixed-length outputs. 
Cryptographic hash fuuctions, however, are used in Illodem day cryptographic 
applicatiol1s aud therefore have to satisfy certain security properties, whereas 
conventional hash fuuctions are used in non-cryptographic environments and do 
lill practice, it hash fUlIctioll 1l will map from the dOlllaill {U. l}'" for SOllle large ,///" aud uot 
fl'Olll {U. I} "'-'. This is 1I0t really of allY eOllseq uellee sillce 'In is larger thall allY message that we 











not need to he secure. \\Tithiu the field of cryptography the term hash function 
ha~ become synOUYlllOUS with the term cryptographic hash function. We adopt 
this cOllvelltioll nIld it is assllmed that all hash fUllct.ioIlS referred to are crypto-
graphic hash fUllCtiOllS. 
Sincc the domain of a hash fUllction is significantly larger than its rangc, it is 
illevitable that mallY illputs lIlap to the same output. III other words, there al-
ways exist llUlnel'OUS collisions, but the point is that two such colliding illputs 
should be computationally infeasible to find. (Here 'computationally infeasible' 
could lllean requiring super-polynomial effort, or requiring effort far exceeding 
available resolUces.) 
The basic idea behind hash fUllctions is that a hash value serves as a compact 
representative image of a specific input, and we want to be able to use this rep-
I'!~sel\latiw image as if it. wen~ llniql1dy identifiable with the corresponding input. 
strillg. A practical illustration of this idea is a digital signature scheme. The 
message to be signed is first fed through a hash function and the resulting hash 
value is signed in place of the original message. Thus each signatmc is in fact 
a signature 011 all infinite number of messages; however, the collision-resistance 
property ensmes that no olle knows what the other messages are. 
Cr,vptographic hash functions are often modelled using random oracles. A random 
oracle can be thought of as a mathematical function that maps every possible in-
put (called a query) ill its domain to a tmly random output (called the response) 
in its rallge. A random oracle consistelltly responds with the same response for 
allY sperifi(' query. 
Hash functions can be split. int.o two categories: Keyed hash functions and uu-
keyed hash fUllctiollS. All unkeyed hash functioll takes in a single input, namely 
the message to be hashed, and a keyed hash function takes in two inputs the 











Sll111Ccl that the algorithmic ~pecificati()ns of ha:-;b functions are public knowledge, 
Sillce hash fUllctions displa.y the inherent dmmcteristic of ease of cOluputatioll, if 
the hash function is ullkeyed theu anyone can compute the hash value of a given 
input: for keyed hash flluctiou:-; ouly the users who know the key can compute the 
hash, The theory of keyed and unkeyed hash fUllctions is quite dissimilar, and 
this dissertatiou will consider ouly unkeyed hash functions, 
3.2 Hash function properties 
J\ good hash function satisfies the following three major properties: 
Property 1. Preimage resistance 
A hash juncti.on H is said to be preim.age resistant if, yiven a hash 'val'ue y, 'it is 
cOlllptdationally infeasible to find an input x such that H (x) = !J, 
Property 2. Second preimage resistance 
A hash jlLnction H is second preimage resistant if, given an input value x, it is 
computationally infeasible to find an input x', with :r of- x', such that H (x) = 
H (:);') , 
Property 3. Collision resistance 
A hash function H is collision 7'esistant if it is computationally infeasible to find 
any two inputs x and :];', with x of- x', such that H(x) = H(:];') , (Such a pair-
(x, J:') is known as a collision pair'.) 
The properties of preiruage resistance, second preirnage resistance and collision 
resistance are givrm in order of increasing strength: in other words, finding a 
collision is ea:-;ier for an attacker than finding a second preimage, which is in 
~(meral (alt.hough not always) easier than finding a preil1lage, 
Theorem 3.2.1. Collision Tesistance =:} second pr'eimage r'esistance. 
Proof. V/e prove the contrapositive: If H is not. second preirnage resistant, 
then for some x we call find an x', with x of- J;', such that H(x) = H(x'), We 











lilt llitivdy, we wOllld CxP(~ct it to he casler for an attacker to find il secoud 
preilllag,(~ x' of H(:r), given :r, than it is to find a preimage of H(:r) gIven no 
fmther information. For example, the hash function H (;r) = :r2 moo n where n 
is the product of two large primes fJ and (j and the factori;l,ation of II, is unknown, 
finding a preilllage is computationally infeasible: we would need to be able to find 
a square root modulo n and this is computationally equivalent to factoring IL, 
an intractable problem in itself. Finding a second preirnage, however, is trivial: 
given .r, -:r yields a collision. 
The following argument illustrates that it is reasonable to assume tha.t second 
preilllage resistance implies preirnage resistance for hash functions used ill prac-
tice. Let H be an n-bit hash function, and recall that in practice, H takes inputs 
from a finite set of size 2"1 for some large m »n. If H behaves like a random 
function, then for every possible hash value y there are about 2",-n values in 
the domain of H that hash to y. If an attacker can find preimages for a signifi-
cant fraction of possible hash values, then given :I; E {O, 1}1Il he simply c:0mputes 
H (:r) = ,lj and then uses his prcimage-finding algorithm to find a pre-image x' of 
(2"'-" I) 2" 
II Then with I)robability - = 1 - - we have x' ..L x and he has found a d' 2m n 2m I 
second preimage. 
The above argument assumes that all possible hash values are equally likely. 
However, it is possible to construct hash functions for which this is not the case. 
\Ve now present an example of a hash function that is second preirnage resistant 
but not preimage resistant. Let y be a second preirnage resistant hash function 
such that y : {O,l}OO --7 {O,l}n, and consider the hash function H defined as 
follows: 
if x has bitlength fL, 
otherwise. 
\\Te now have a second preirnage resistant hash function H : {O, l}CKl --7 {O, l}n+l 
that is not preimage resistant: For a hash value H(x) with left-most bit 0, we 











the prcilll<lp,c, :r. 
In the above example, for hash values whose first bit is 0 there is precisely one 
preilllage, so oiJViollSly fiuding a second preimage is impossible. However, this 
hash fllllctiun is sOlllewhat contrived aud Olle would not expect to see sllch hush 
fllnctiom; llsed ill practice. In practice, collisioll resistance is the stl'Ollgest of all 
three of the major hash fum:tion properties. It is the hardest to satisfy and the 
easiest to break. Once collision resistance has been breached in practice, so has 
second preilllage resistance and preimage resistance. 
Au unkeyed hash fuuctioll that satisfies prcilllage resistance aud secOlH.l prcilllage 
resistance is known as a une way hash functiun (0 W H F). A hash function that 
exhibits all three of the aforementioned properties is knowll as a cullisiun r'esis-
tant hash functiun (CRHF). The figure below depicts a simple taxonomy of hash 
functiolls acconling to the three major hash fuuctioll properties. 
uukeyed 
2l!d-preimage resistance 
collisioll resistance t--....--! 











3.3 What are hash functions used for? 
Originally, hash functions were designed for the purposes of providiug data in-
teyrity and data urigin integrity. Providing data integrity llleaus ensuring that 
infonuation has not been altered by unauthori~ed or unknown means. Providing 
data origin integrity llleans verifying the origin of information. Data origin in-
tegrity aud data integrity cannot be separated. As soon as information has been 
altered, it effectively has a new source; and if a source cannot be verified, then the 
issue of integrity cannot be settled. Therefore, verification of integrity implicitly 
provides data origin authentication and vice versa. 
Hash fUIlctiolls used for the purposes of data integrity and message autheuti-
catioll scttisfy some, or all three, of the major hash function properties. 
3.3.1 Data integrity and message authentication 
Digital signatures 
Data integrity can be established by using a hash function and a secure channel. 
Before Alice sends a lllessage x to Hob, she uses a hash function to colllPute 
H(:t). She sends:t to Hob over an unsecured channel and transmits H(x) over a 
secure channel. Hob hashes the received data and compares his result to the hash 
result, H(x), received from Alice. If the two are identical, Bob accepts that the 
information has Bot been altered by unauthorized or unknown means, i.e., data 
integrity is established. See Figure 3.2. 
ALlCE ullsecured chanuel BOB 
x' (data recei veel) :r 
authentic dmllllel 1 
H(:r) ------- HCr') '! =? H(:r) 











The seClll'e challlwi could be provided, for exall\plL~, by a digital signature scheme. 
This is a TlWC-hallislIl cousisting of a signature generation aJgorit.lull and a verifica-
tion algorithlll. The siguature geueration algorithw produces a digital signature, 
alld the verificatioll algorithm is a method for verifyillg the authenticity of a dig-
ital signature. In the description to follow we deuote the signatme generation 
algorithlll by Sty and the verification algorithm by vel". 
Suppose Alice wants to send a signed message, x, to Bob. She first feeds :1: 
through a hash function H and obtains H(x). Since H(:J:) is usually considerably 
:mwller than :r, Alice signs H(:r) instead of x ill order to save time. To sigu H(x) 
Alice computes siy(H(:r)) by sendiug H(x) through the signing algorithm. She 
then sends the pair (x, siy(H(:r))) to Bob. Since it is possible for the message 
to be corrupted during transmission, we denote the received message by x'. Bob 
receives the pair (:r/, siy(H(:J:))), and applies the hash function to :r/. He also 
feeds 8iy(H(:r)) illto the verification algorithm to ohtain ve,.(siy(H(:r))) = H(x). 
[1' H(x' ) = H(x), then Bob has successfully authenticated the signature and he 
call be assured that the message was sent by Alice. If H(x) f; H(X'), then it pos-
sible that the lllessage has beeu altered since signing, or that someone is trying 
to impersonate Alice. See Figure 3.3. 
For the purposes of security we would like H to be collision resistant. Since Alice 
siglls H (J;) instead of :r, she essentially also signs all messages that hash to the 
S,Ulle value as H(:J:). If Alice can find a collisiou pair, (x, x'), theu she can later 
clailll she siglled x' instead of :c. Alternatively, if Bob can find a collbion pair 
(.1:, ;[;/) such that Alice would be willing to sigll x, he is later ill a position to claim 
that she sigued :r'. 
Due to t.he fad that hash fUllctiollS are modelled Oll randolll oracles and be-
have like olle-way functions, they are also used for purposes other than data 

















j ( :1:, :; i y ( H (;z:) ) ) 
sly(ll(;r)) ~-------~. (:[,1, siy(H(:r)) 
l 
H)J;/) 
ver(siy(H(:r))) = H(:r) 
1 
H (x') ? = ? H(:I:) 
Figure 3.3: Digital signature scheme 
3.3.2 Confirmation of knowledge 
l\Icchanisllls that clllploy hash functions for thc purposc of confirmation of knowl-
edge illclude commitment schemes, password verification and tT"Usted timestamp-
mg. 
Commitment schemes 
A commitment schellle is a mechanism that allows a user to commit to a value 
while keeping it secret, and permits the user to reveal the value at a later stage. 
Consider for example an auction, where the parties submit their bids in sealed 
envelopes to the auctioneer who opens the envelopes and announces the highest 
bidder. If a bidder, Alice. is to pay her bid (as would be the case in a first-price 
Huctioll), she is highly motivated to bid just slightly over the runner-up. An un-
scrupulous auctioneer, Eve, may leak the bids before the auction clears, allowing 
her accolllplice, Alice, to overbid other participants by a minimal amount. One 
possible solution to this problem is to remove the trust from Eve by letting the 
parties cOlIlmit to their bids without disclosing them. 
A secure commitment scheme binds the cOlllmitted party to a value without 











often sllggested as a computationally efficient way of constructing commitment 
schemes: H (:r) acts as a COlllluitmellt to;l:. A secmity Ctrgulllellt lIlay go alollg the 
fullowiug lines: If H is collision-resistant, the cOlllmitment can only be opened to 
J: (otherwise the cheating party, Alice, is able to find a collision): if H is preimage 
resistant, recovering J; from H(x) is infeasible, which implies the hiding property. 
This argument as it stands is dearly inadequate. Preimage resistance is only 
guaranteed in the absence of auy prior iufol'fuatiou, which is plainly false in the 
cast' of the input as structured as an auction bid. In particular, a cmious adver-
sary may go through all possibilities for the value of the bid, applying the hash 
fUllctioll to them allCl comparing the result with the cOlllmitted value. Secondly, 
Alice may just copy SUlllconc ebe's bid, whid1 might be sufficient in SOl11e sce-
narios. However, both these problems can easily be avoided if the cOlIllllitment 
scheme is l'alldomised to prevent forward search, and if the protocol requires the 
illclusion of the conllnitter's identity. 
Password verification 
In general, for security reasons, user passwords are not stored in plaintext. In-
stead, a hash value of the password is stored. Whenever a user provides a pass-
word, the hash value of the password provided is computed and compared to the 
stored hash value. If the two hash results are the same, the user is authenticated 
and access is granted. The hash function clearly has to be preimage resistant; 
otherwise if a malicious hackel', Eve, obtains the hash value H(P) of Alice's pass-
word P, then she might be able to determine a password P' which has the same 
hash value, and hence would work just as well as P. 
Trusted timestamping 
Timestarnping is the process of recording the time of creation or modification 
of infonnation. TT"Usted timestamping refers to doing this in a secme manuer. 
According to the widely accepted Internet X.500 Public Key InfrW3tructure Time-
Stamp Protocol (ReF 3161) [ACPZ01], a trusted timestamp is oue which is issued 











followiug scC'uHl'io motivates the Heed for timestarnping. 
Suppose that Alice has produced a IlHxlical cure:r. Assume that there are rnallY 
llledical researchers working illdepelldently, and simultalleously, on this cure. It 
should not be possible for Alice to backdat.e the time of creatioll of her cure, alld 
it should be possible later, when Bob also finds the cure, for her to prove that 
she did indeed know it by this time. 
Alice computes the ha.sh of :r, H(:J;). She sends this to a. trusted t.imesta.mp-
ing authority. The TSA allocates this data a timestamp T1, concatenates the 
timestamp to H(x) and computes a hash of this concatenated result (Tl dellotes 
the version of the timestamp at time 1). This new hash value H(H(x)IITl) is 
digitally signed by the TSA using its private key k. The signed hash value, 
sigd H (H (T) II Td), together with the timestamp are sellt back to Alice. Alice 
stores the cure, the signed hash value and the timestamp together ill the same 
place. See Figure 3.4. 
For trusted timestamping we require that the hash function H be preimage resis-
tant. When Alice sends H(:r) to the TSA, for the sake of confidentiality, the TSA 
should not be able to obtain T from a knowledge of H (x). Also, Bob can verify 
that Alice has not predated the creation of the cure and Alice is in a position to 
prove that she was illdeed in possession of the cure at the time of timestamping. 
This is done as follows: 
At the time of verification (some time after time 1) Alice reveals her alleged cure T' 
and her alleged t.ime stamp T{. The hash of :1:' is calculated alld t.he alleged times-
talllP is appeuded to H (T'). This result is then sent through t.he hash fuuction 
to obtaiu H(H(:r')IIT{). The digit.al signature of the TSA is checked by using the 
public key, k', of the TSA and sending sigdH(H(x)IITd) through the verification 
algorit.hm of the digital signature scheme to obtain ver~(sigk(H(H(x)IITl))) = 
H(H(T)IITr}. If H(H(x')IIT{)) = H(H(x)IITr), then it is accepted that the times-



















H (H(l;) 111'1) 
l 
::;iy/.J H (H (X) 111'1)) 
! 
::;iYk(H(l;)IITd) + Tl 
Figure 3.1: Issuing a timestamp 
ami also that :r is correct. If the two hash results are not equal, then it is possible 
that the timestamp has been altered, or that it was not genuinely signed by the 
TSA. Figme 3.5 depicts this process. 
3.3.3 Key derivation 
A /,;e:1/ derivation functiun is a function which derives one or more secret keys 
frolll all ullkllowll value, or possibly frolll a piece of known inforlllatioll such as a 
password or passphrase. An example of such a function is PHKDFl (Password-
Based Key Derivation Functiun 1), which forms part of the RSA Laboratories' 
Password-Based Cryptography Standard [KalOO]. PBKDFl makes use of a hash 
fUllction and a cryptographic salt. This salt is made up of random bits that 
are added to a password or pass phrase before the password or passphrase is sent 

















H(H(x')IIT{)? = ?H(H(x)IITI) 
Figure 3.5: Checking the timestamp 
fUllctiCJll for c iterations to the concatenation of the password P and the salt S. 
kl H(PIIS) 
k2 = H(k l ) 
DK = len(kJ 
The function len extracts the first t bits of kc to obtain a key of length t. The 
specification of PHKDFl a.llows for it to produce a key with maximum length of 
160 bits. PHKLJF2 [KalOO] allows for the productioll of larger keys. PBKLJF2 
makes use of a pseudorandom function such as a hash function or a block ci-
pher to derive the key. The pseudorandom function given as an example in the 
RSA Laboratories' Password-Based Cryptography Specification clocument is a 
pseudorandom function based on a hash function [KalOO]. 
3.3.4 Pseudorandom number generation 
A pseudorandom number generator generates sequences of numbers which satisfy 











011 ralldoll! oracles, it is possible to gellerate pSClldol'Ulldolll llll Illb en; by USlllg 
a bash functioll. This is done, for exalllple, by applying a hash fllllctioll to a 
couuter. For C1 = initial val'ue, we compute H (C1) = o,J, then H(C2) = a'2 and 
so 011. It is hoped t.hat the sequence aI, a'l,'" is a sequence of pseudorandolll 
nUlnbers. In order for this generating mechanism to be cryptographically secure 
(by which we lllenll that given part of the sequence it is not possible to predict 
the next bit), the iui tial value of the counter must be both random and secret, 
RecorrUllendatious for random number generation using hash functions from the 












Construction for Hash Functions 
According to the definition provided in Chapter 3, a hash function needs to be 
able to accept a string of arbitrary length as input and to output a string of 
fixed length. The generic construction currently used for most popular hash 
functions was first descril)(xl by Ralph Merkle lI\Icr79] in 1979. In 1989 Ralph 
.\Ierkle and Ivan Damg,hd [Dr89] independently proved the construction to be 
secure under certain assumptions, and hence today we refer to it as the Merkle-
Damgard construction for hash functions. 
4.1 Definitions and notation 
Before the details of the construction are introduced, we present a few definitions 
and the notation to be used: 
Definition 4.1.1. A curnpnossion function is a function that maps an m-bit string 
to alL fl.-bit I"dring, wlieTern > n. More formally, a comp'T'ession function is a 
function 
f: {O, I}I! x {a, 1}1 ---> {a, I}I!, 











N ate. The compression fUllction can either be described as taking iu two iuputs, 
one of length It bits and one of length l bits, or as taking one input of leugth 
III = n + i. \IVe will fiud it convenient to switch loosely between these two descrip-
tions. III other words, for an n-bit value x, an i-bit value y and a compression 
function f, we will consider feeding the two inputs x and y into f as being identi-
CHI to feedillg the single input :rlly iuto f; i.e., we consider f(x, y) to be the same 
as f(J;lly). 
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compression fUllctiollS of F, G and H respectively 
initializatioll vector (J V) 
the itl! message block, i E N 
the i tb chaiuing value, i E N 
the binary string consisting of t zeros 
bit-length of :1: 
concatenation of :.t and y 
addition modulo 2J2 of x nnd y 
bitwise 'aud' of x and y 
bitwise 'or' of 1: and y 
bitwise 'xor' of x and y 
bitwise complement of x 
rotation of x left by ij bits 
4.2 The Merkle-Damgard construction 
Iterated hash functions operate on messages of arbitrary length by iteratively 
processing fixecl-Iellgth pieces of the message to be hashed. 'We refer to these 











hash fUlJction F: {O,l}CXl --+ {O,l}". Let f: {a,l}" x {(),1}1 --+ {a,l}" be the 
compression function of F. If we wish to hash a message of arbitra.ry length, At, 
we follow the procedure outlined below. Assume for now that the length of M is 
a llluitiple of l. 
1. Break fIJ up into k message blocks of length I. We denote these message 
2. Set ho to some pre-specified n-bit value called the initialization vector, or 
IV. 
4. Set F(fIJ) = hI.;. 
For a graphical representation of this process see Figure 4.1. The hi are called 
chaining values; the output from the compression function f in round i - 1 
becomes one of the inputs to f in round i. The second input to f in round 
i is the itl! message block, mi. Also, note that F(mlllrn211 ... llml.;-11Imk) = 
f(F( lrL lllm211·· ·llrnk-l)llmd· 
1 
!to -W-h1 - W-h2 -
Figure 4.1: Iterative hashing process 
In the event that I !ill is not a multiple of l, we append extra bits to the end of At 
to ensure that message blocks of the conect size will be fed into the compression 
function of F. This is called padding. One possible way of padding a message 
is to append as few a-bits as possible to the end of the message such that the 
length of the augmented message is a multiple of I. However, this method is 
ambiguous it is not possible to pinpoint where a message trailing with O-bits 










I-bit to the message ami thereafter appending the l'equil'eclullmber of O-bits. (So 
if the Ilwssagl~ leugth is all integra'! lUultiple of t, we will add oue bloek of' paddiug). 
After jJaddiug has beell dOlle, a siugle message bloek e011tainiug the length of 
the origillal Illessnge is of tell appended to the nuguwllted message. This is known 
as ~\'lerkJe-Dalllg:trd strengthening. The bits represellting the message length are 
lIsually right. justified ill the final block. If the length field is larger in bit-size 
than l, it may be spread over multiple message blocks. The final block is added 
for security reasons, because it foil:,; a second preimage finding attack known as 
the lung message attack (described in Chapter 6). The procedure for hashiug au 
arbitmry-leugth lllessage M uow reads as follows: 
1. Pad message 1'vl until liH I is a multiple of l. 
2. Break the augmented messa.ge up into k blocks of length t. We denote the 
lllessage blocks ml, m'2, ... ,fnl.;_l, mk· 
3. Append the lllessage block TTli.;+1 containing the length ofm (right justified). 
,1. Set Ito to some pre-specified value 1 V. 
5. For i from 1 to k + 1 let hi = f(hi - 1, mJ 
6. SetF(M)=h/.;+l. 
Figme 1.2 depicts the process outlined above. 
A note on initialization vectors 
Initialisation vectors could be fixed or randomly chosen, but in either case it is 
ilIlportaut that the 1 V is a knowu value, and that the salIle 1 V be used when 













; lClIgtlt field 
[lit' [ 
-- []J- hk+1 = F(AJ) 
Figure 4.2: Iterative hashing process with padding and Merkle-Damgard strength-
elllllg 
4.3 Merkle's meta method and Damgard's con-
struction 
We now prcsent the constructions suggested by rvIerkle [Mer79] and Damgard 
[Dr89]. We thCll provide a gelleral security proof for the constructioll mentiolled in 
Section 4.2, alld adapt this proof for both the Merkle and Damgard constructions. 
4.3.1 Merkle's meta method 
The method most commonly used to construct modern-da.y ha.sh functiolls (refer 
to Sectioll 4.2) is largely based on Merkle's l\leta IVlethod [Mer79]. His method 
for hashing all arbitrary length message !v! is as follows: 
For a gIven cOlllpression fUllctiou f from In bits to n bits, we set the IV to 
Oft, pad the message if nccessary, and obtain F( M) by following the hashing 
processes mentioned in the previous section. 
4.3.2 Damgard's construction 
Damgaxd's construction is slightly more complicated than the construction pro-
vided b.v l\Ierkle. Also, Darngard's original definitions are phrased in terms of 
collision resistant families of functiolls I. We follow Merkle in working with a 
1 A fixed size hash fUllction family F is an infinite family of finite sets {F", }~=l' aud a 











single iterated hnsh fUllction and its compressioll functioll. For a cOlllpressioll 
fUllctioll f fWlfl In bits to n bits, where IfI = n + I and I > 1, Datugiird's COll-
stwctiOll reads as follows: 
1. Break the nwssage, AI, up illto blocks of size l - 1 bits. If the last block is 
incomplete, IJad it with zeros. 
2. Let rl be the number of zeros needed, and let L be the length of the message 
with padding. We then have message blocks TnI, rrL2, ... ,ffLk, where k = I~J' 
3. Append all extra (l - 1 )-bit block mk+1 colltaining the binary l'epresenta-
tiOll of d, right justified. (Note that here we are appending the number of 
paddiug zeroes, uot the entire message leugth.) 
,1. Fm i hom 2 to /,; + 1 let 
} j '(()II+I!1 ). 1 /, 1 = . I fI ~ 1 , (\.ll( 
G. SetF(M)=h/,:+J. 
The constructioll given above is slightly more cOlllplicated than the one mentioned 
previously. The reaSOll for the additional 0 or 1 in the middle of the input to 
f in Step tl will become clear ill the discussion of the secmity IJroof in the uext 
sectiOll. 
4.3.3 A security proof 
\Ve llo\V provide a security proof for the general construction described in Section 
4.2. \\'e first consider the construction without ~lerkle-Damgard strengthening, 
Hlld prove the following lemllla. 
Lemma 4.3.1. Let F be an iterated hash function with cornpr-ession fnnction 
f· Assume we can find a colli8ion under- the hash function F (witho'ut Me7'klr:-
Darngard 8trcngthr:ning). If the colliding rnessage8 have the same number of 
i~ Ii fUllctiulI f : {O, 1 f" -> {O, l}t(,,,); ill uther wonls, F,,, is the set of all fUllctiulis from In bit.s 










blocks, then we can find 11 collision tmder the compression jllnction f. OtheT'-
wisp 1JJP ("1m .~:nd either (J, coll'i8iorl under f 01' (L p'reimage of the 1 V 'Under F. 
Proof. Assume we have found M and M', with M =l1'v1', such that F( A1) = 
F ( i\}1). Let t cienote the number of message blocks in M, and let t' denote the 
ulllllber of message blocks in Al', where without loss of generality t' ~ t. Since 
F(i\1) = F(JH /) we have 
and thus 
f(F(rnlll··· Ilmt-I),mt) = f(F(IfL~II·· ·llm;'_I),m;,). (4.1) 
If either ITit =I m;, or F(mlll· .. IImt-l) =I F(ni~ II· .. Ilm';'-I) then we have found a 
collision lluder f and we are done. Otherwise, if F(mlll·· ·llmt-l) = F(m~ II·· .llm;'-l) 
awl lilt = m;" then we consider 
and rcpeat the arf!;urncllt. The process will cornc to a halt either whcn wc find a 
collisiou uuder f or when 
If i ' = t, thell this means Tni =I rn~ (else we would have M = M') and 
so we have found a collision under f. If t' > t, then we have 
(4.2) 
so eithcr we have fouud a collision under f, or nil = rn;'_l+l and 
and we have found a pre-illlage of the J V uudcr F. 0 












Theorem 4.3.2. Let 1" he an iterated hash function with cmT/pression function 
f· 1f f is collision 1'(oiiiiitant, then iiO iii F. 
Proof. Assullle that we have fouud 111 and M', with Al i= iV!', such that 
F(M) = F(i\1'). If t.he leugths of M and 111' are the same then a st.raightforward 
exteusion of Lemllla 4.3.1 to the case with Merkle-DamgE1.rd strengthening gives 
liS a collision lIuder f. So suppuse the llwssagc lcllgths arc different. 
In the case of l\Icrklc's method, the Rppcnding of the length field ensures that 
the finRI message blocks of 111 and M' are different, so equation 4.1 gives us a 
collision under I. In Darngaxd's construction, equation 4.2 is replaced by 
( 4.3) 
The fact that the first message block ml is processed differently from the others 
in Dalllgard's construction prevents the inputs to f being the same on the left 
haud side and right hand side: clearly O"+lllfILl i= F(m'lll·· ·llrr~~'_t)lllllmtl-t+l 
because of the () or 1 sandwiched between the two inputs of the compression 
fUllctioll. Thus we have found a collisio11 uuder I, and we are done. 0 
4.4 A more specific classification 
Staying within the l\Ierkle-Damgclrd paradigm. we now briefly discuss three meth-
ods for constructing compression functiolls. These include: hash functions based 
on block ciphers, customized ha.sh functions and hash functions based on modular 
arithmetic. 
4.4.1 Hash functions based on block ciphers 
An advantage of building hash functions using block ciphers is that many efficient 
block cipher illlplementations already exist. SOUle block-cipher-based collstruc-
tions are provably secure assllming the underlying block ciphers exhibit certain 
ideal properties. However, ill reality block ciphers are not random functions and 











to say what properties of block ciphers are needed ill practice in order to build 
secure hash functiolls, and whether or not good block ciphers guarantee good 
hash functions. 
Definition 4.4.1. A block cipher is a map E : {O, I}" x {O, I}" ----f {O, I}" s'Uch 
that for k E {O, I}" and for' x E {O,I}I!, the function Ek(X) = E(k,x) is a 
perm'Utation on {O, I}". We say that the n-bit plaintext x is encrypted 'Under' the 
f;:-bit key k. For a block cipheT" E, there exists E-1 s'Uch that E;;1 (y) is a plaintext 
;r:' for which Edx') = y. 
The l\Iatyas-Meyer-Oseas, Davies-l\1eyer and fvIiyaguchi- Preneel hash functions 
are all hash functions based on block ciphers. The figure below depicts a single 
iteration of the Davies-l\leyer compression function; the other two hash functions 
are similar. Each scheme makes use of the following: 
1. A generic n-bit block cipher Ek ; 
2. A function 9 that maps n-bit inputs to keys, k, for E (note that k will be 
public); and 
3. A fixed IV ho that can be used in E. 
In the Davies-Meyer construction each intermediate chaining value hi is obtained 
b.y using the current message block to encrypt the previous chaining value hi-I, 
and then XORing again with this value to prevent inverting the compression 
function. In other words, 
4.4.2 Customized hash functions 
Customized hash functions are designed from scratch so as not to be constrained 
by the use of existing system components such as block ciphers. They are de-
















Figlll'e 1.3: The Davies-.Meyer compression function 
Examples of such functiolls are those based on the l\ID4 hash function. This 
fuuction was iuveuted by Ronald Rivest [Riv92a] in 1990. Owing to secUl'ity eon-
cems, lllclll,Y versious and adaptatious have been invented since, iucludiug MD5 
[HivU2b], SHA-O [NIS93] aud SHA-1 [NISU5]. 
We !lOW provide a detailed description of the MD4 algorithm. We include it 
uot ouly as au example of a eustomized hash function, but also as au example of 
the use of the Ylerkle-Dalllg£ird construction ill practice. 
MD4 
The '\ID4 hash function consists of three rounds of sixteen operations each. Before 
we describe the hashing proeess, we introduce the three boolean functions 1'*, g* 
and Ii* that are to be used in rouuds one, two and three respectively. Eaeh 
fuuction takes three 32-bit words as input and produces one 32-bit word as output. 
We let X, Y ami Z denote 32-bit words. The functions are defined as follows: 
}'*(X, Y, Z) 
y*(X, Y Z) 
h*(X, Y, Z) 
(X 1\ Y) V ((-,X) 1\ Z) 
(X 1\ Y) V (X 1\ Z) V (Y 1\ Z) 
X EB Y EB Z. 











1. Pad the message and append the length field. 
The 1"lD4 hash fuuetion processes 512-bit message blocks. When padding, 
\ve have to allow for the last. 64 bit.s of the augmented message to 
contaiu the length:! of M. Thus, we pad Ai until it is cOllgruent to 
448 mod 512. We employ 'ullambiguous' padding, i.e., we first append 
a siugle I-bit aud thereafter append the required munber of 0-bits. 
Once this is done, we append a 54-bit. binary representation of IMI. 
The length of the augmented message is now a multiple of 512. Note 
that it is also a multiple of sixteen 32-bit words. We let WOl ... , WL - 1 
denote the 32-bit words comprising the augment.ed message. 
2. Set the IV 
A four-word buffer (A, B, C, D) is used t.hroughout the hashing process. 
The final mestmge digest. will oe the concatenation of the 32-oit words 
in the registers A, H, C and D following t.he last comput.ation of the 
compression function. We initialize these registers with the following 
hexadecilllal values (in little-endian) to obtaiu ho: 
A .- 67L152301 
B '- EFCDAB89 
C '- 98BADCFE 
D '- 10325476 
3. Process the message blocks 
For ea,ch 512-bit message block, we do the followillg: 
for i = 0 to (L/16) - 1 do 
for j = 0 to 15 do 
















Let [abed k ".] denote the opemtioll of leavillg b, c, d, k and". Ull-
challged and changillg u as follows: 
a = (u + r(b, e, d) + X k ) «<~ 
We perforlIl the followillg sixteen operations (from left to right): 
[ABCD 0 3] [DABC 1 7] [CDAB 2 11] [BCDA 3 19] 
[ABCD 4 3] [DABC 57] [CDAB 6 11] [BCDA 7 19] 
[ABCD 8 3] [DABC 9 7] [CDAB 10 11] [BCDA 1119] 
[AHCD 123] [DABC 137] [CDAB 14 11] [BCDA 15 19] 
ROUND 2 
Let [abed k ".] be defined as follows: 
(l = (a + g*(b, c, d) + X k + 5A827999) «<~ 
We perform the following sixteen operations (from left to right): 
[ABCD 0 3] [DABC ,15] [CDAB 8 9] [BCDA 12 13] 
[AHCD 13] [DAHC 55] [CDAB 9 9] [BCDA 13 13] 
[ABCD 2 3] [DABC 6 5] [CDAB 10 9] [BCDA 14 13] 
[AHCD 3 3] [DABC 7 5] [CDAB 11 9] [BCDA 15 13] 
ROUND 3 
Let [abed k ".] be defined as follows: 
(L = (a + h*(b, e, d) + X k + 6ED9EBA1) «<8 



















[DABC 8 0] 
[lJABC 10 9] 
[DABG 0 9] 
[DAHe 11 9] 
4. Output the message digest 
[CDAB ,111] [BCDA 12 15] 
[CDAB (j 11] [BClJA 14 15] 
[CDAB 5 11] [BCDA 13 15] 
[CDAE 7 11] [BGlJA 15 15] 
The final output reads as follows: M D4(M) = AI/BIICIID. This will 
be all output of sii':e 128 bits. 
The diagram below is a schematic repres(~lltation of the IVID Ll hashing process. 
We denote the lellgth of the augmented message (including padding and the 
l(~llg;th fidei) by IM'I. The llllluber of 512-bit lllessage blocks is thus IM'I/512, 
delloted t. Accordillg to the algorithm above, ho = (A, il, C, D) and hi = 
(A + A', B + H', C + G', 1) + lJ'). 
W·* Ito ---- g* ---hl h* 
Figure 4.4: The MDt! hashing process 
4.4.3 Hash functions based on modular arithmetic 
Hash functions based on mod ular arithmetic are iterated hash functions in which 











Tvv'o advHlltageous aspects of such hash fUllctions include: (i) the ability to i:lcale 
N and therefore the siile of the hash so as to obtain a desired secmity level, (md 
(ii) the ava.ilability of existing software and components for modular arithmetic 
from other cryptographic protocols. However, hash functions based on Uloclular 
aritluuetic: do not iuclude speecl as a favourable performance feature awl arc 
therefore not COUllIlOllly used in practice. 
4.5 BABI: A toy hash function 
All practical illustratiolls of the generic attacks mentionecl ill Chapters 5 and 6 
will make use of the h,tsh function described below. It has been Built A.'i a Ba.'i'ic; 
in.'itance and will be referred to as BABI from this point ouwards. The practi-
cal illustrations to come are iutended to be as simple and as easy to follow as 
possible. For this reaSOll, BAHI has been built to accommodate ouly messages 
of short length, and has not been built to be secure. Due to the nature of many 
of the attacks in Chapters [) and 6, it will be important to be able to easily find 
collisions ou the compression function of BAl:H for the purposes of illustratiou. 
BABl is based on lllodular arithmetic and has been built according to the speci-
fications suggested by Ivan Damgard in [01'89]. The suggestion for a ~ecure hash 
function to be built USillg l1lodular arithmetic is llot SurpriSillg givell the hard-
ness of extracting roots lIlodulo N, where N is the product of two large primes. 
Darngclrd's construction reads as follows: 
Let N be the product of two large primes, p and CJ. Let the length of N be 
u bits. We choose a proper subset 1 such that 1 ~ {1, 2, ... , a}. For allY a-bit 
strillg b1, b'2, ... ,b" we define the function fl to be the cOllcatenation of all hi such 
that i E 1. 












The size of each chaining variable hi - 1 is n bits, the size of each message block 
rrLi is t bits, and hence Tn = n + t. The input variable BUFFER represents the 
sequence of bits required to ensure that the input to f is greater than .JlIi but 
less than N/2. This helps avoid trivial collisions of the form x'2 == (_x)'2 mod N, 
and ensures that modular reduction always takes place, thus foiling attempts to 
find collisions of small magnitude. 
III order to ensure that f is both secure and efficient, the subset I has to be 
chosen with some care. In order to avoid an attack by Marc Girault [Gir88]' I 
should specify bit positions that are spread evenly over all II possible positions. 
Howcv(~r, choosillg random bit positions do(~s not optimize efficiency. Allowing 
for positions that are grouped together makes more sense when keeping efficiency 
in mind. Also, if III is too small, then the set of possible hash values has a maxi-
mum size of 2111 and thus an attack applicable to all hash functions known as the 
birthday attack3 becomes computationally feasible. 
BABI has been built according to the design principle outlined above, but due 
to the fact that it need not be secure and should be easy to implement, certain 
conditions have been relaxed. We present the algorithm below. See Appendix A 
for the JAVA SOUl'ce code. In what follows we let Iml represent the length of the 
message blocks and Ihl the length of the chaining values. 
1. Determine N 
Two small primes, P and (j, are selected such that N = PrJ. BABI allows 
for the user to select p and rJ. The primes should be selected to be slIlall in 
order to aid ease of computation and to make it possible to find collisions 
in the cOlnpression function (since we want the compression function to be 
easy to break). BABI has a built-in primality test for p and (j. 











2. Determine the buffer, Iml and Ihl 
The va.llle of HU FFh'H is set to r JNl and we set the auxiliary variable 
1 N'J'EHV At to lIT J - r JAIl. We let the bit length of the input to the 
cOllljHessioll fUllctioll, l, be defined such that l = bitleugth(J NTBRV AL)-
1. We let the length of the lllessage blocks be Iml = r & 1 + 1 and the length 
of the dmilling values be Ihl = l&J -1; i.e., the message block length will 
always be larger than the length of the chaining values. 
3. Set the IV 
We set the IV to 0. It is possible to set the IV to any constant of the 
conect size, say a randomly generated value perhaps. 
4. Split the message into blocks and pad the message 
As the message COUles in, it is split up into blocks of the specified size. All 
message blocks are stored and processed when necessary. This is admittedly 
not the most efficient way of computing a hash value; ideally, message blocks 
should be processed as they are read in. If the message length is a multiple 
of the lllessage block leugth, then no padding is added. If the message is 
not a Ulultiple of Im,l, theu it is padded with a 1 followed by the required 
nUlllber of zeros. 
5. Append the length field 
The length field is set to be a multiple of the message block length, i.e., tlml 
bits are set aside to contain the binary representation of the length of M 
for some integer t. The code in Appendix A specifies t to be 4. The length 
representation of A1 is right justified in this length field. The reason why 
the length field is set to be a multiple of Ifni is to ensure that no additional 
padding needs to be sandwiched between the partially augmented lllessage 
and the last tlmJ bits. We acknowledge that this is not. ideal since messages 
of louger length can only be accommodated when larger primes are used. 
6. Process the message blocks 
The overall size of the input to BABI is a lIlultiple of Iml. We let k cienote 











vallie 1/, we define the compression function of BABI to be 
I(h,m) = II ((BU F F ER + hllm)2 mod N), 
where /1 selects the last Ihl bits of ((BUFFER + hlltn)~ lilac! N). FOl' i 
frolll 1 to k, message bloeks are processed as follows 
7. Output the hash value 
We output HABI(M) = hA·· 
The input to modular squa.ring in the compression function of BABI is slightly 
cliH'erent from the idea suggested by Damgard. However, it still ensures that this 
particular bit of input is greater than yfjii and less than N /2. 
Secmity was Hot an important design goal when creating BABI (although it 
does coutain certain security enhancers such as Merkle-Damgaxd strengthening 
anel the elimination of trivial roots). BABI has largely been built to be relatively 
insecure so as to be able to easily implement and demonstrate some of the generic 












Generic Attacks on Hash 
functions 
III this chapter we collect and describe attacks that are applicable to all hash 
functions. These attacks would work even if the hash functioll in question was a 
randolll oracle. 
5.1 The birthday attack 
The birthday attack is a collision-finding attack: the attacker hopes to find two 
distinct inputs, 1\1 and M', that hash to the same value under SOIlle hash fUllction 
F. The attack was pointed out by Yuval [Yuv79], who justified it by the birthday 
problelll (described in Chapter 2), although Nishimura and Sibuya [NS88] were 
the first to give a propel' mathematical analysis of it in terms of the birthday 
problelll between two sets. 
5.1.1 Finding a collision in one set of messages 
Suppose that F is an n-bit hash function, and consider a set of k « 21t messages, 
chm';Cll at randolll. Assumillg all 2" hash values are equally likely, recall froll1 
Chapter 2 that there is a collision in the set with probability 
-k~ 











where here rn = 2" is the lllunbul' of possible hash value::;. This probability is & 
whell 
(2.3) 
So if all attacker computes the hash values of 1. 2 . 2"/'2 distinct messages and 
searches for two hash values that are the same, he has a 50% challce of produciug 
a collisiou. 
We llOW consider the expected rUlllung time of the birthday attack. A quick 
upper bouud for this expected time is given by the geometric distribution (see 
Chapter 2): computiug the hash values of 2n /"l. messages gives a collisioll with 
probability 
(5.1 ) 
so the expected llumbur of times tlw attacker would nuud to run this attack in 
order for it to be successful is (/4 = 2.5. This would lllean cOlllPuting the hash of 
2.5·2"/"1. Jllessages (and the llLunber of calls to the compression function would of 
course depeud 011 the length of the messages). This analysis aSSUllles the attacker 
computes 2"/"2 values, looks for a collision, and then throws away those values and 
starts again if there is none. Suppose instead that the attacker computes hash 
values of ralldoJll messages until he produces a collision: how 10llg do we expect 
this to take? The expected llumber of messages needed is 
:xl 
L j . Prob(first collision occurs when It: = j) 
j""l 
= L j . (p(j) - p(j - 1)) , 
j~l 
and a careful analysis (Fact 2.27 in [MvOV96], or see [Knu68], section 1.2.11.3) 
shows that this is approximately 
Often in practice the constants 1.25 or 2.5 are ignored, and the average-case work 











wurst-case work would 1m given by the pigeon-hole principle: the attacker can 
ollly Iw assur~d of fimliug a collision ill 2/1 + 1 attempts.) 
The birt.hday attack is lllHwoidable; it is applicable to all hash fuuctions (it would 
even work if F was a truly randoUl function, 01' a black box). If it is the best 
kUOWll attack all the collision resistance of a particular hash fuuction F, theu F' 
is said to have ideal SeCllT'ity as far as collision resistance is concerned. III general, 
we speak about F as having a security lev ell of 2n/'2. 
Example 5.1.1. We now apply the birthday attack to BABI. We ran the attack 
three times; each time iucreasing the value of the primes used. All messages are 
gi ven in hexadecilllai. Collidillg pairs are indicated ill bold. 
Attack 1: We let fi = 71 and we let q = 73. This results in all output of 
leugth II bits. We tried the followiug 24/ 2 = 4 messages 
Ah 1 5468652063617420736174206ffie20746865206d617420616e6420626974206d652e 
~l. 546865206f6c64206d616e20696e207468652073656120616e6420686974206f782e 
M 1 , 4f6c6420646f6 72072617 420696e207 46865206c696520616e642068697 4206f782e 
~14 43616c2063756c206c617420657420686577206f726420746861207469732069742e, 
and find that j\ft~ and 11114 have the same hash value b. 
Attack 2: We let fJ = 211 and we let q = 281. This results in all output of 
I We ~uy that F hus ideal security ill terms of preimage resistallce alld secOlld preirnage 
n~sistallce if the best kllOWll attack Oil both properties is a brute force attack, i.e., hashillg 
random I1H'ssag<'s lIlltil \\'(' find on(' with the desired hash - w(' have a 03% chance of finding 





























and find that 1\121 and A12~ have the same hash value 3b. 











leulJ,tlJ 8 bit:.;. \Vc tried the fuUowiug iift/'.l = lG lllutisage<i 
JII , 546BS52063617420736174206~e207468652D6d617420616@6420626914206d652@ 
I\i:ll - 546865206f6c64206d616e2D696e207468652073656120616e6420686974206f782e 
Al~, - 202020202e62616c6c736d616c6c7374616c6c7363616c6c7320202020736e616b65 
M a., 726162697 4686f62697 46c6f62697 46b6f62697 46e6f6d626f2e202020202D202020 
M:j" 6c696d626f2062696d626f206a696d626f206b696d626f2072696d626f202020202e 
M~/j = 67697a6d6f74696e6b6572696d626f2e6c6f6d626f636f6d626f2020202020202020 
M:h 546865206f6c6420646f6720696e207 468652073656120616e64206c697 420697 42e 
M;J, 202020202e20202020686f757365686f7273656c6f7573656d6f7573656c696d626f 
M:1,1 202020202e686f7273656b696d626f6d6f757365736e616b65736e69706520202020 
AI;, I I.! 62696d626f6c696d626f686f7273656272616b6520202020202020202e6e65696768 
Al~11 68616c6c7363616c6c7362616c6c736d616c6c732e2020202020202020686f6c6473 
Al~,~ 736e616b65202020202e2020202068616b65736d616b65736c696b6573736d696c65 
Ai:J I ~l 686f6c64 73636f6c64 73726f6c64 736d6f6c64 732e2020202020202020686f727365 
A1314 - 6c6164656c686164656c726164656c6d6164656c202020202e202020206269726473 
M31~' 70757070796c757070796d7570707963757070792e20202020202020206875707079 
M 311j 202020207 4696d 626f6e696d 626f722e6f6d626f636f6d 626f6c696d 626f2022020, 
nnd fiud that "'hl awl "~1:I!f; have the sume hash value 58. 
The table below slIllllllarizes our results. Note that small primes have been used 
for the pmposes of ill tlstratioll. 
~'1 N n 
21t /'). .tv/ AI' hash vi:l.hw (bit~) hatih value (hex.) , 
71 n G18~i ,1 ,1 M2~ M'.!.j 1011 b 
I 211 I 281 59291 6 8 1\1:;4 11;/3, 111011 3b 











5.1.2 Finding a collision between two sets of messages 
It is illlPortant to observe how the birthday attack can be used in practice. If a 
dishollcst signer, Alicc, could find H collisioll iJctwecn <.L 'gooJ' llleSi'mge All and a 
'bad' (or fl'Huduleut) message 111'2, then she is in the position to provide a signa-
tun~ 011 M1 , ami theu later dailll that she signed M'2 instead. A collision of this 
llatun~ is of use to Alka because recall that a digital signature scheme signs the 
hash of a message, ami Hot the message itself (see Section 3.3.1). 
For the attack to work, Alice would Heed to obtain a collision betweeu a set 
of good lllessages auel a set of bad messages. Recall hOUl Sed ion 2.4 that if the 
size of both sets of messages is k, then the probability of obtaiuing a collisiou 
betweeu the two sets is p(k) = 1 - e-~. So, for an n-bit hash fUllCtiOll F, if we 
compute the hash values of 211/'2 good messages and 211 / 2 bad messages, then we 
will have a probability of 1 - e- 1 ~ 0.03 of finding a collisioll. 
To obtain two collidillg messages, Alice chooses a good message M 1, aud a bad 
message M'2, and then does the following: 
Step 1 She generates 2n/'2 minor modifications of Ail, denoted M{. A minor 
modification could include substituting tab characters for spaces in text 
files, or perhaps substituting unpriutable characters for each other. 
Step 2 She hashes each of the 2"/2 modified messages and stores each result with 
its associated lllessage. 
Step 3 She generates minor modifications M~ of 1\12 , As she generates these mes-
sages, she computes the hash of each, F(M~), and checks for any matches 
between F( M~) and the hash values computed in Step 2. She keeps goillg 
until she finds a watch. She expects to find a match within about 211/ 2 
candidate messages Ivl~. 
Assmning that Alice finds Mt and M; such that F(Mt) = F(AI;), she can now 











tilt'll later claim that this is a signature for Ali since F(Mt) = F(M.J.) and hCHce 
the signat.ures ale the sallle. The work for this attack is about 2 x 211 /'2 times the 
length of the lllessages. (It is comprised of the 211 /'2 hash values that nced to be 
compllted ill Step 2, and tlJe 211 /'J hash computations that need to be done ill Step 
:), each of which involves one call to the cOlnpressioll flluctiou for every block of 
the message.) 
5.2 Memoryless techniques for finding collisions 
The obvious way to find a collision using the birthday attack is to keep a list of 
lllessages aud their hash values, aud each time we compute a new hash value to 
check the list to see if it has occurred before; this has a storage requirement of 
o (2 11 /'2). In this section we discuss two reiinements of the birthday attack which 
use milch less storage. Both are based on Pollard's Rhu methocF.! [PoI75j. The 
method essentially works by producing, instead of a sequence of randolll values 
of F(:r), a seqllence of values which "looks" random but which has the advantage 
that ollce a value repeats, the sequence will continue to repeat frotH there. 
5.2.1 Pollard's Rho Method 
Let F be all It-bit hash function, and consider a restricted version of F (i.e. F 
wi th a restricted domain), denoted F,. and defined by 
1,' . {I 2 ?"} {I 2 ')It} ,.. "'."_ ---f 1 ' •• "_ • 
We observe that F,. can be modelled as a pseudo-mndom function on the set of all 
It-bit blocks. If we select all n-bit block Xu at l'CtndOlH and consider the sequence 
for i = 1, 2, ... , we obtain a pseudo-random sequellce which, since {O, I}" is a 
tillite set. must cventually start to cycle (sec Chapter 2, Sectioll 2.6). By the 
2This IIwtlwd WHS illtroduced by .J.Pollard ill 1975 as a techlli4ue 1'01' factorillg composites 











bi1'l helay paradox argumcllt, thc expected llulIlbor of inputs that Huod to be wu-
siderud before this hap pOllS is about Vl'ff~/f = 1.25 .2"/'2 (seo Section 5.1.1). The 
l{IlO llletilOd derives its mune frolll the fact that tho shape of the path 'walked' 
t.hrol\gh the sequellce roselIlbles the Greek letter rho. III what follows, we let J.L 
dellote the h~llgth of the cyde, and we let). dellote the length of the tail (the part 
of the sequence before the cycle). In figure 2.1 the tail has length two, and the 
cycle has lellgth six. 
Xg XlO 
X;j -- X4 
/ \ 
/. \ / 
J:l :£7 -- X(j 
/ :1: 13 J; J'2 
J:o 
If we can find the start of the cycle, i.e., values). and JI such that F/\(:ro) = 
}~>'+II(J;()) = w, say, but }~~-I(:r[)) =I FI~+II-l(XO) (sillce one is ou the tail and 
the other is on the cycle), we have two different preimages for wand hence have 
fouud a collision. Obviously we could keep a list of }~~(x) for i = 0,1,2, ... until 
we find F/(x) = F~~(x) with j =I k, but this would take up a lot of memory. 
5.2.2 Floyd's cycle finding attack 
III order to reduce the st.orage requirement needed to nlll the birthday attack, 
wo call lllake 1lse of Floyd's cycle-finding algorithm ([Fl067], or see [MvOV96], 
section 3.8). This algorithw works by l'ullnillg two instances of the sequence at 
the same tillle. one twice as fast as the other. In other words, for i = 1,2, ... 
the algorithm computes F:~(x[)) = F~.(F/-l(X[))) and F/i(x) = F~(}"',.(F;(i-l)(;ro))), 
aud compares them. If F:(x) i- F/i(J;) , then the next pair (F:+l(X), F;(Hl)(J:)) 
is cOlllPuted, and the previous pair can be discarded. The algorithm halts when 











Notc that j,:i(:r) = 1<2i(J;) if auel only if 2i - 'i = i is a llluitiple of the cyde 
lellgth Ii alld i is greater than or equal to the tail length /\. So the value of i 
fOllnd by the algorithlll will be the lowest multiple of /1 that is greater than or 
equal to A, and hence i ~ /\ + fl.. So although the method will probably not detect 
the cyde as soon as it starts (as the straightforward Rho method does), it will 
detect it within one cycle leugth of the start. 
l\' ow that we have i we Heed to find the start of the cycle, in order to obtain 
our wllisioll }~.(F,>'-l(:Eo)) = F,.(F,>'+/l-l(XO)), and remember that we caunot run 
the sequeuce backwards from pi(xo) and F'2tro) since we cannot invert the hash 
fuuction. So starting at the positions x = F,~J(x) and F:(x) in the sequence, we 
compute and corupare }~l(x) and F,i+l(x). If these are uot. equal, we discard these 
values ,md compute and compare the next set values, F,.I.(x) and }~+"2(:r). We 
contiuue ill this fashion until we arrive at two values F: (x) and Fi+~ (x) such that 
j':"'(:r) = }~~+"(:r) for some sEN. We have now found the value of the tail length, 
A = s, awl we now know where the sequence starts to cycle. 
This aU ack yields 110 illlProvement on the birthday at.tack in tenns of time 
complexity, but the storage requirements are significantly reduced. On aver-
age VI· 2"/'2 hash values need to be computed for each instance of the sequellce 
before the collision is found. This keeps the time complexity of the attack at 
0(2"/:!). In tenns of storage, however, only two values need to be stored at a 
time. This lUeans a storage requirement of 0(1). 
There is an improvement on Floyd's c~rcl(' finding algorit.hm by Richard Brent 
[Bre80], and some more efficient techniques such as the method by Sedgewick, 











5.2.3 The QD attack 
In 1989 Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Jean-Paul Delescaille [QD89] proposed a 
different lllenlOrylcss strategy for finding collisions under a hash function F. We 
adopt the convention of [Mit07] and refer to this as the QD attack. Paul van 
Oorschot and :YIichael Wiener [VOW!)!)) refined the attack by making it both 
parallelisable and capable of producing meaningful collisions3 . As with the at-
tack above, this attack yields no improvement on the birthday attack in terms of 
time complexity, but the storage requirements are significantly reduced. 
Quisquater anel Delescaille's cycle detection algorithm makes use of distinguished 
paints. An n-bit block Xd is considered to be a distinguished point if it satisfies 
some predefined distinguishing criterion. A criterion such as this could be, for 
instance, requiring that the 8 leftmost bits of a distinguished block are all zero. 
l\litchell [Mit07] suggests that a block be distinguished if the leftmost n/2 - s 
bits of the block are all zero for some small 8. So, one in 2,,/2-8 = 2;:~ blocks is 
distinguished; in 2"/2 iterations of Fr we expect to find 2" distinguished points. 
The distinguishing criterion should be set to enable fast computation. The idea 
of the method is that once we get a collision in the sequence Xo, Xl, ... we will 
also find that the next distinguished block we encounter has occurred before, so 
it is only necessary to store the distinguished points. (Enough blocks are distin-
guished that we expect to have at least one on the cycle.) 
In order to find a collision under F we establish a distinguishing criterion, for 
example, the one suggested by Mitchell, and we do the following: 
Step 1 We choose a random n-bit block x. 
Step 2 For i = 1,2, ... , we compute F,i(x). If F:(x) satisfies the distinguishing 
criterion for some i. then we record the distinguished pair (i, F:(x)). If, 
3The terlll 'lIleaIliIlgful collisiolls' refers to collidiIlg messages that are I10t simply just a 
collr'ct.ioll of random nonsensr' - thr'Y paRS off as kgit.imatc messages that could he signed or 











additionally, there exists a distinguished pair (j, pi (x)) such that 
F/ ( :c) = Fi ( :r ) 
for j <i, we tenlllUH.te the process. (Note that, since we expect to got a 
distingllished collisiou in 0 (2ft/:.!) time, we ollly use 0 (2~) storage space for 
the distinguished poillts). 
The result of the algorithm described directly above is a pair (j, i) such that 
l·~J(J:) = F;'(x) with 1 :::; j < i, aud i - j is the length of the cycle. In the unlikely 
event that :r itself lies on the cycle, then l·~i-j(x) = :r. This does not give us a 
collisiou, but we do have a preimage l·~-j-l(J;) of :r. However, since am aim is 
to locate a collision, in this case we select another randolIl block x' anel run the 
algorithlll again. If:r is not on the cycle, then for some t < j (where j - t = ,\ is 
the poiut at which the cycle starts), 
Hence, we have a collision; F/-t - 1(x) and F/.- t - 1(.r) collide uuder Fr and therefore 
also collide under F. We call fine! F~~-t-l(X) alld F;-t-l(:r) by reverting back to 
the previously stored distinguished poillts and working forwards (since we know 












Generic Attacks on Iterated 
Hash Functions 
In this chapter we collect and describe generic attacks on iterated ha.sh functions. 
These attacks work on any hash function built on the Merkle-Damgard construc-
tion, even if the compression function is treated as a black box. They highlight 
the weaknesses of the Merklc-DaIIlg~trd construction, aud show that iterated hash 
functions do not behave like the random oracles on which they are often modeled. 
6.1 The multicollision attack 
With the following attack, Antoine JOllX [Jou04] answered the long sta.nding open 
problelll of whether or not the concatenation of two independent hash values was 
lllore secure thall a single hash value. This concatenated construction allegedly 
appeared first in Preneel's PhD thesis [Pre93] and was called cascading. It was 
presented as a means to increase the security level of a hash function at the 
cost of decreased perfOrIllanCe, since it is obviously easier to use two existing n-
bit hash fUllctions than it is to design a new 2n-bit hash function. Intuitively, 
two concatenated n-bit hash functions form a 2n-bit hash function, and one 
wight hope that the collision resistance of the new hash function is improved to 
0(2211/2) = 0(2"). See for example Fact 9.27 in [MvOV96] for this view, which 











twe if onc of the hash functiolls is iterated. In order to solve the problem, the 
silllpler task of cOllstruc.:ting a lIlultieoliision in au iterated hash fuuction had to 
be addressed. \Ve now introduce the concept of a lUulticollisiun. 
Definition 6.1.1. A multicollision is an r-tuple of messages such that all r mes-
sages hash to the same vai'ue. Such a collision is r-efe7"red to as an {"-collision. 
The multicollision concept iutroduces a !lew security property of hash functions 
kllowu as r'-colli8ion freeness or T-collision r·esistance. We might hope that hav-
ing this property would improve the security of a hash fuuctioll. Intuitively, 
coustructing r different lllessages that all hash to the same value should be much 
lllort' difficult than fiudiug only twu such messages. This is indeed the case for 
raudolll orades, but Joux shows that it is not true for iterated hash fum:tiolls. 
For the pmposes of this discllHsion we consider a hash functioll F and its COUl-
pression function f. This hash function is subject to the generic birthday attack, 
i.e. the pruba bility of fiuding a 2-collision within roughly 21!/"l. hash values is fairly 
high. For ,.-collisions, the collision probability is given by (V1), and we expect 
to find an ,.-collision by hashing about 21!·(,.-1)/r different messages (see equation 
(2.6) ). Certaiuly if the at tacker was treating the hash fuuctioll as a random oracle 
aud using a straight birthday attack it would take 0(2/1·(,.-1)/1") calls to the hash 
functioll. Wheu r is large, this value tends to 2/1. Surprisiugly, in the case of 
iterated hash functiolls, the followiug attack by JOllX shows that constructing a 
ltlulticollisioll is not much harder than cOllstructiug au ordinary 2-collisioll. 
6.1.1 Building multicollisions 
\Ve nO\v describe .Joux's attack [.1ou04], which shows that constructing a 2k_ 
collisiou ouly costs k times as much as cOllstructing an ordinary 2-collision. As 
far as the padding process is concerued, when cOllsidering collisions between mes-
sages of the same length, padding can be ignored since blocks of padding are 
identical. As soou as the messages collide on SOllle intermediate chaining value, 











Sillll!'. TIJ1l~, for llIt's:"ng,es of the ~all1e length, fiuding collisiolls withuut padding 
i~ SYIIOllYlllOllS to filldiug collisiolls with paddillg. 
JOllX: plcsellts tlw attack for the case iu whidl it is assumed t.hat the si;,o:e of 
the lllessage blocks is bigger thau the size of the hush aud chaining val ues (which 
wOllld IIsually be the case). It is also assumed that we have access to all algo-
rithm C that finds collisions under the compression with a fixed first input (for 
installce, C could be the birthday attack). For a hash function F, given a dmill-
iug value h as input, C outputs two different message blocks m and m' such that 
f(h, m.) = f(h, m'). The algorithlll lIlay make use of the birthday attack or any 
other specific attack based 011 a wealmess of f. It. is imperative that C works 
properly for all chaining values (or at least for a significant proportion of t.hem). 
III order to illustratf~ how the attack works, we first describe how <1 4-collisioll 
is obtained from two calls to C. Starting with all initial value ho = 11/, our first 
call to C yields two blocks Inl and m~ such that f(h(J, Inl) = f(ho, mD = z. We 
HOW allow z to be our Hew dlCtiniug value, and our !-lecond call to C finds blocks 
In"}. aud I/I,~ SHch that f(z, In'.!) = f(z, If/~). We uow have a 4-collision since 
with the meS!-lages (mlllm21IImdding), (millm; Ilrmdding), (m~ l!m2!!padding) and 
(rn~ III/L~I!padding) all hashiug to the sallle value. 
We IlOW extend the above process to obtain a 2k-collisiou from k calls to C: 
Step 1 Start with an initial value 11/ = ho. 
Step 2 For i from 1 to k 
- call C and find tni and m; such that f(h i- 1, mi) = f(hi-1,m;) 
- let h, = f(h/-l,mi). 











using tile birthday attack takes 2H /'2 calls to the cOUlIHessioll fuuctiou, aud 
we l}(,pd to fiud k suell collisiollS. 
Step 3 Pnd (ifllecessnry) and output 2k messages in the form (b1Ilb:lJJ ... JJbIJpaddiug) 
where hi is Olle of either lILi or mj. 
Besides all 21.: messages hasliillg to the same value, we also have that all illtenne-
diate chaining values are identical. Below we provide a schell1atic representation 
of the lllultico11ision cOllstruction. 
Inl 'in '2 mk-l mk 
~~ ~~
ho hI ft..! . ..... hk - 2 hk - l hk 
~'--..,/ ~~ 
I I ,I I 
Inl In'.! tnl.:_1 /fI,/.: 
Figlll'e 6.1: A 2k -co11isio11 for F 
Example 6.1.1. We now build a 22-collision for BASI. We use the primes]J = 457 
and IJ = 233. This results in a message block length of eight bits, i.e., one ASCll 
character each. All chaining values are six bits long. We build the following 
lIlulticollisioll without taking :Ylerkle-Damgard strengthening into account. We 
use the birthday attack to find message blocks 0 and q that collide on f(h o, .), 





Ito = 000000 hi = 011111 h'2 = 100100 
~ ~
q 
Figme 6.2: A 22-collisiou for BABI 












6.1.2 A consequence of the multicollision attack: Cas-
caded hash functions 
An obvious way of increasing the size of a hash value is to concatenate two or 
more smaller hash valucs coming from two or morc completely diH'crcnt hash 
functions, or from multiple instances of the same hash function. Cascading two 
existing hash functions is presumably easier than constructing a llew hash func-
tion of a larger size. In fact, until this attack by Joux it had long been assumed 
that if both hash functions have ideal security, then so does the fUllction created 
by the concatenation of these functions. 
We consider the concatenation of two independent secure hash functions F and 
e. \Ve label the compression functions of these two hash functions f and 9 re-
spectively. It is hoped that the security of the cascaded hash function H = File 
is of the desired level with respect to collision resistance, preimage resistance and 
second preimage resistance. In other words, we hope that with respect to each 
security level, the security of H is the product of the seclll'ity levels of F and e. 
In the case of random oracles this is most certainly true since the only available 
'tt +1ly 
attack is the birthday attack on File which takes 0(2 2 ), where nf and Tty are 
the sizes of the outputs of F and e respectively. As far as iterated hash functions 
are concerned however, by making use of the multi-collision attack, Joux shows 
that this is not the case. In fact, Joux shows that if F or e is an iterated hash 
function, then File is no more secure than F or e by itself. 
Collision resistance 
\Ve let F and e be secure iterated hash functions. \Ve assume that F outputs 
an nrbit hash value and that G outputs an ny-bit hash value. Thus, in terms 
of collision resistance, the secmity level of F is 2"t/2 and the security level of G 
is 2"'1/2. If FilG was ideally secme, it would exhibit a security level of 2(,,/+n9 )/2. 
However, assuming without loss of generality that nf :s: ny, there exists an attack 











The attack works as follow~: \Vc set J,; equal to T rounded up, and filld a 2k_ 
Illltlticollisioll 011 F 1lsillg J01lX'S method. If Oil!' collision finding algorithlJl, C, 
uses the generic birthday attack to find collisions bet\veen blocks, thell in total 
we make roughly k2/1d'2 calls to the eOlllpl'essioll functioll of F. 
\Ve !lOW have a 2k-collisioll Oll F. Since k 2: T' all we need do is apply the 
birthday attack to the 2k different messages all hashing to the same value under 
F, auLl with reasollable pl'Obability we will get a collision under G. Im:reasing J,; 
illcreases the pl'Obability of success. 
Work 
With regards to the complexity of the attack, we know that finding a 2k-collisioll 
on F costs roughly k2k calls to the compression function of F. With respect to 
the work done in finding a collision on G, we lIlust take into account the con-
tribution of applying G to 2k different Illessages, each of which has a length of 
I.: blocks. Naively, this would cost k2k applications of the compression fum:tion 
of G. However, the tree structure of the messages helps to reduce the number 
of calls to ,r;, because to compute the hash of xllrn and xllrn' once the hash of x 
is already COIll pll ted only takes two more calls to g. In fact, if the com pression 
functions of F and G act on the same size blocks, then the number of calls to 9 
is roughly 2k, one for each edge in the graph below. See figure 6.3: here ho is the 
IV of G. 
fLo 











The wlIllbcr of calls llHl,dc tu the cumpression fUllctiull ill the diagralll above is ill 
fact 2k+! siuce there are 2i l'nlls at each level of the tree, and L:;~! 'lJ = 2k+l = 
0(2"). 
If f anel ,I} do not act 011 the salUe si",e blocks, then additional paddiug (constaut 
paddillg at the eud of the shorter blocks) may be required in order to sYllchl'Olli",e 
the hUlCt-iollS before the tree structure call be of help. We can see that puttiug 
together the work involved in finding collisions on F alld G respectively, gives the 
attack a complexity of the order of n g 21!t/'2 + 2I!y/'2. 
It is ilIlportant to llote that the application of this attack does not require G 
to be all iterated hash function. The attack exploits the fact that F is an iter-
ated hash function; it would still work if G were a random oracle. Of course, ill 
this case, the coutribution of eva.luatiug G on 2" different messages would be k2" 
since 110 simplification frolll t.he tree structnre is possihle. 
Example 6.1.2. Since we do have not have two or more completely different toy 
hash functiolls, the best we can do in terms of illustrating the abuve is to consider 
the hash function H' = BABIIIBABl'. We use the primes ]J = 457 and '1 = 233 
for both BABI a.nd BABI'. This meallS that message blocks are eight bits long, 
i.e .. one ASCII character, and tha.t cha.ining values are six bits long. For BABl', 
we set the IV to 111111. We build on example 6,1.1 and find a 2J-collision for 





ho = 000000 hI = 011111 h2 = 100100 h:3 = 110100 
'~~ ~
q z 
Figure 6.4: A 2J-collision for BABI 
Under BABI the messa.ges ohg, qiz, oig, oiz, qhg, qhz, ohz and qig all hash to 











and find that the lllcssages qiz and oig collide uuder BABl'. Both messages have 
a hash value uuder BABl' of 101000. We therefore tonclude that the funttion 
H' = BABIIII3ABl' is no safer than H = 13ABI. 
Preirnage resistance of cascaded hash functions 
Again, we work with two setme iterated hash functions F and G, and as be-
fore, F outputs an nrbit hash value and G outputs an ny-bit hash value. With 
regards to preilllage resistaute the level of security of F is 21!! and the level of 
security of G is 2"9. The seturity of FIIG wOllld be 2"f+ n y if FIIG was ideally 
secure. However, Joux [.Jou04] shows that there exists an attack on the preimage 
resistance of FIIG with cOlllplexity of order lLy'2"d'2 + 21t! + 21ty. 
Assuming that r/,f ~ ny, the attack works as follows: \Ve set k equal to fly 
and construct a 2k-collision under Fusing Joux's method. It tosts k2"d2 taUs 
to f to tonstruct this Ululticollision (if we use the generit birthday attack 
there might of course be a quicker way for that specific compression function). 
At this stage, the common value of the 2k different messages under F will almost 
tertainly not align with our predetermined target value. 'rVe thus searth for all 
additional block that maps the last dmining value to the target value. When 
searching for this blotk, we need to consider messages under F with the padding 
included. In the worst tase, this will tost 2lt f calls to f. 
Sillce II, = lLy, we expect (with probability 63%) at lea~t 011e of the 2k me~­
sages to hash to the desired ny-bit value under G. Obviollsly, increasing the siz;e 
of It: beyond Tty iutreases the probability of suctess. Assuming that f and 9 ad 
on the same size blocks, the work done using a naive approach to find the desired 
target value under G costs up to k2"y (= ny2/1y) calls to 9 because we have to find 
the hash under G of 2/1y ny-blotk messages. Once again, making use of the tree 
structure of the messages helps to reduce this to 0(2/1y ). Again, if the assulllPtion 












Pllttillg togethur the COlltributiollS of applying f atHl y where needed gives the 
attuck it complexity of ortier //'u2ILj/'J + 2"1 + 'lILy. Yet aga.iu, we oo!;erve tlmt G 
lle(~d not lw all itcrated function for the attack to work; it will also work wheu 
(,' is a randum oracle. In this case the complexity would be of the artier of 
fiU2"tI'2 + '2"f + fiy'2"Y. 
6.2 The long-message attack 
The long-lllessage attack, (h~!;cribecl in [lVlvOV96], violates the second preimage 
resistance of an iterated hash function F that cloes uot use Mcrkle-Damgal'cl 
strengthening. \Ve start with an extremely long message, Mtaruet, with 2il + 1 
message lJlocks, where 1l is some large lllunber. \Ve uuw search for a liuking 
lllessage Inlill~· that lmshes fwm fLo to one of the iutermediate chaiuing values of 
M/uI"yd. If f(h o, IILlinlJ = Itj, then AI' = flLlillkllmj+lllmj+'2II· .. llrn'2i(+l will have 
the same hash as J,;J/"I"ud . 
Work 
The probability of reaching one of the 2il intermediate hash states from 11,0 via 
flili,,!.: is ~::. \Ve therefore expect to try roughly ~ = 21l - H messages in search of 
Inlill!.: (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
Since M/"I".'lct is very long, this is significantly less than the 21l work needed to 
run a brute force attack on second preilllage resistance. This also lIleans that for 
long messages such a!; !vlturue{, finding a second preimage is easier than finding 
a preilllage. This does !lot hold true for sllOrter messages since the brute force 
l:lttHck is llot significantly improved upon. 
The longer M/r}I"yei is, the more significant the saving oyer the 0(211) work ueeded 
for a brute force attack. If, for example, R = ~, then the alIlouut of work re-











colli~ion (assllwing uso of tho birthday nt-tuck). IvIossag,es of this luugth, however, 
are llOt practical. 
Obviously, l\'lerkle-Dmngitrd strengthelling foils this attack since M' and A/targd 
arc llot of the sallle lellgth, !:l0 the last block of AI, 1n21i+l' will llot be all appro-
priate last block for M'. If there is no 1\lerkle-Daltlgard strengthening, thell an 
aU acker need only find a second preirnage of any of the chaining values in order 
to find a second preimage of /I,ftaryet. 
6.3 The long-message attack with expandable 
messages 
In 1999 Richard Denn [Dea99] found a way to get around Merkle-DarngaTd 
strengthenillg in the long-llle!:l!:lage attack for ha!:lh function!:l who!:le cOlllpl'e!:lsion 
functions adlllit easily-found ]i.Ted points, by using expandable 'messages to keep 
the length of the second pl'eiruage message the sallle. In 2005 Johu Kelsey and 
Bruce Schneier [KS05] found a way to get expandable messages without fixed 
points b.v using a clever adaptation of JOllX'S llluiticollision technique, and thus 
extended the long-message attack to all Merkle-Damgard hash function!:l, even 
with Merkle-Darngard !:ltrengthenillg. 
For an n-bit iterated hash function F, the Kelsey-Schneier attack finds a second 
preimage for a message with 2k luessage block!:i in roughly 2k+! + 21L /:.l+! + 21L - k 
calls to the cornpres!:lion fUllction. When messages are long, thi!:l i!:l less than the 
required brute force alIlount of work. The attack lIlight not be of practical impor-
tance - it is at least as expensive as finding a collision, and the target messages 
for which it is significantly faster than a brute force second preimage search are 
impractically long. However, it does delllOn!:ltrate the discrepancies between iter-
ated hash functioll!:l ami the mudolll oracle!:l all which these functions are often 
modeled. Its bigge!:lt significance is that it show!:l that iterated hash functions can-











cannot reach the cOlUlllonly-claimed security bounds of hash functions against 
secund preirnage resistance. 
\Ve describe first Dean's technique for constructing expandable messages if you 
call find lllany fixed points on the compression function, and then Kelsey aud 
Schneier's more general technique. Finally we show how Dean used expandable 
messages to find a second preimage of a long message in the presence of !vlerkle-
Damgard strengthening. 
6.3.1 Expandable messages from fixed points 
\\'e now explain what we mean by an "expandable message". 
Definitioll 6.3.1. An e.rpan dable message is a set of diffcTenf messages of vanlin9 
lengths that all collide on the input to the last call of the coTllpr'ession function 
(i. e., when yo'u hash all of these messages, their' second-to-last chaining values 
will all be the same). An (a, b)-expandable message is an expandable message 
that can take on any length from a to b message blocks. 
Expandable messages are easy to construct if you can easily find fixed points in 
the compressioll fUllction: 
Definition 6.3.2. FaT a compression function f with f(h i , Ini+l) = hi+l' a fi:red 
point is a pair (hi, mi+l) such that f(h i , fni+l) = hi' 
Compression functions based on the Davies-Meyer construction (See Chapter 1, 
figure 4.3) admit easily found fixed points. In this construction each intermediate 
chainillg value is obtained by using the current message block to encrypt the pre-
vious chaining value, and then XORing again with this value to prevent inverting 
the compression function. In other words, 
So (h. rn) is a fixed point if and only if h = E",(h) 2- h, which is the same as 











olle ~illlpl.v decrypts the ~ero vector IIlH1cr the key 11/" i.e., aile fiuds It = D"JO). 
lJt:wies-:\leyer bash fuuetiollS iuclude 1\104 [Rivtl2a], rvlD5 [H.ivtl2b], Tigor [A1396] 
awl the SHA falllily [NIS93], lNIS95]. The techuiques used tu find fixed~poillts 
allow for 110 choice over hi, although they might over lit. Seveml more such tech-
uiqlles exist awl a few of them are discussed ill [1\,10191] amI [PGV!J3j. 
Dean's technique builds an expandable message (of a very particular form) with 
about twice as much work as finding a collision, Le. with about 2 x 2"/'2 = 2/l/:l+1 
calls to the compression function. The algorithm works as follows: 
Step 1 Constl'llct a list of 211/'2 fixed-points. Split the fixed~point pairs (h, m) 
into two lists, A aud 13: on A list all the chainiug values, hi, aud on B list 
all the associated message blocks, mi, sllch that f(h i, nli) = hi' 





Step 2 Coustruct a list of 2"/'2 hash values that can be reached from some initial 
val ue Ito with one message block, i.e. the out put of f (/io, lit) for 2"/'2 random 
values of m. Store the ha.sh va.lues allCi the associated message blocks on 
two lists. C and lJ. List the hash values in C, auel the message blocks iu O. 
- Fo,. i from 1 to 2"/'2, 
C 0 
hi * Ifl'l 
h2 * rn2* 











Step :3 Fiud a lllatch between lists A and C; i.e., find j aud I such that h) 
h, * = It *, sny. (We exped such a match uy the uil'thdtLY argumcllt). 
Step 4 Return an expallclnule message [mt*, mj] (this notation denotes the use 
of as lllillly copies of the rnl~ block as is llecessary, followed uy aile copy of 
the III,) ulock). 
A message of desired length, say 0: blocks, that takes the initial vallie lt~ to the 
pellultimat.e chainillg value It·, is easily produced. It cOllsists of oue copy of the 
starting message block from list D and 0: - 1 copies of the fixed-point message 
block from list B. 
Work 
III order to constmet lists A and B, the compression function needs to be called 
2"/'2 tillles. The same result holds for the constnwtioll of lists C amiD. 'I'herefore, 
fur an II-bit hash fUllction that allows a maxillluul of 2k blocks in its messages, 
the work ueeded for this technique to produce a (1,2k)-expandable message is 
roughly 2 x '2"/"2 = 2"/:.!+l, (Note that this doesn't depend all k because we 
are using fixed points, producing a. messa.ge of more blocks doesn't require more 
calls to the compression function.) 
6.3.2 Expandable messages without fixed points 
We now describe a different technique by Kelsey and Schneier [1<S05] for build-
ing expandable messages. This is a. generic technique which does not require 
the compression function to admit easily found fixed points, and in fact. works 
for all iterated hash functions. It is closely related to the llluiticollision finding 
technique of Joux (see section 6.1). Joux's technique first finds a sequence of 
single-Illessage- block collisions. These colliding blocks are then pasted together 
to provide a set of messages of equal length that all hash to the same value. The 
technique by Kelsey and Schneier finds a sequence of collisions between messages 
of differellt lcngt.hs, (i.c., t.he messa!!;cs within each collision pair are of differing 











sagt!S of varying lengths that all produce the same penultimate chailliug value 
when fed tltrough u hash function. 
\Ve first show how to find (1 collision between a one block message (111(.1 allother 
of arbitrary length (y; this is simply a birthday attack in which the lllessages in 
each set are chosen to huve n certain forlll. For an n-bit iterated hash fUllctioll 
we use the 11/, !to, and proceed to do the followillg: 
Step 1 Choose a random message block (j, and process it t 
reach the chailling value li/elllfJ . 
(I q fj q 
~~ ~~ 
!to 11,1 h'2' ..... ht - 2 ht - 1 hlt'Hlp 
Figure 0.5: Usillg 0:' - 1 copies of II 
0:' - 1 times to 
Step 2 Compute 2,,/2 hash values hi frorn flo using message blocks, Tn;, of length 
1. Put these values on list A. Also, compute 2,,/2 hash values hi· frolll hternp 
using single-block messages m;. Put these on list B. 
II (I q (I 
~~ ~~ 
ho hI h'2' ..... h t -'2 ht - 1 hle"'fJ 
Figure 6.0: Computing 2"/'2 hash values from h lemp 











A I 13 __ .........J.-~._ 
hl hi' 
h'J 11.'2* 
Step 3 Finel a match between lists A and B, i.e. find j and l sllch that hj 
hi * = h *, say. (We expect such a mateh by the birthday argUlllellt). 
Step 4 Return the colliding message pair (mj, q!lqll· .. IICJllml*)' 
m· .J 
hI) hi h'J' ..... ht - l ht hj = hi 
~~ ~'~ 
(1 IJ (1 rni 
Figure 6.7: A collision betweell an a-block message and a I-block message 
Work 
In Step I, (} - 1 calls are made to the eompression function, and in order to 
construct lists A and B, 2 x 211 /'2 ealls to the eompression funetion need to be 
made. This brings the total work for finding a collision bctwcen a onc-block and 
all a-bloek message to (a -1) + 211/2+1. 
\Ve now show how the above algorithm can be used repeatedly to build an ex-
pandable message: In order to build a (k, k + 2k - I)-expandable lIlessage we 
first follow the process outlined above to find a colliding message pair consist-
iug of a I-block lllessage and a (2 k - 1 + I)-block message starting from ho. We 
then find a second colliding message pair consisting of a I-block message and a 
(2 k - 2 + 1 )-block message starting from h l . The third message pair consists of a 
I-block message and a (2 k -;j + I)-block message starting from h'2. We contiuue 











lllessag,e. Sec till) diagram below: the llllluue[" of blocks in each collicliug ttlessage 
ill a lllessage pair is indicated above or below the corresponding message. 
I,: colliding pairs 
1 1 
~ ~
...... hk -".'. hk - 1 hk 
V '-..-/ 
3 2 
Figure 6.8: Construction of k colliding lIlessage pairs 
By pasting all of the message pairs together we obtain an expandable message 
with miuilllum length k blocks and maximulll length L:J=l (2k- j + 1) = k + 2k -1 
blocks. 
\Ve label the message pairs as follows: 
InI,O 1n2,O ffLk-I,O fnk,O 
~~ ~ ~
ho hi h'2' ..... hk -'2 IIk-1 hk 
~~ '-..-/ ~ 
Figure 6.9: Pasting message pairs together 
We \lOW show that we call use this pattern to produce a message 1'.1 of any desired 
leugth () uetween k aud k + 2k - 1. Note that in each lllessage pair {lni,n, In;,d, 
message /Iii.! is 2i blocks longer than lllessagerni,O' \,ye can therefore build a 
llH'ssage of length C\' by using the bits of the binary representation of Ct - k to 
select ffL"O or mi,l for each i. If C\' - k = L:~:[: ~i2' (recall () - k < 2l), then 
for i = 1. 2, ... ,k, choose the short message mi,O if ~i = 0, else choose the long 











selected at each stage, i.e., 
M = m(1,jdllm(2,j2)11·· ·llm(k,.h1 
where.j; E {a, I}. 
Work 
Finding the ith message pair takes 2i - 1 + 211 / 2+1 calls to the compression function, 
so in total thc nUlllbcr of calls to thc cOlllprcssioll function involvcel in fineling a 
message of length 0: between k and k + 2k - 1 is 
k-1 
k2 r1 / 2+ J + L 2i 
;=0 
= k:2,,/2+J + 2k - 1 
~ k2 n / 2+1 + 2k. 
(I\ ote this depends on k rather than Oll a, because \ve still have to find all k 
message pairs no matter what 0: is.) If k « n then the number of calls is 
approximately k2 11 / 2+ 1. 
Remark 6.3.1. Both this generic technique and Dean's technique allow for ex-
pandable messages to start at any chaining valtw, which means that we can build 
messages that start with a desired prefix. 
Remark 6.3.2. This technique builds a 2k -collision, before the final compression 
function computation is taken into account, by using roughly k: x 211 / 2+ 1 calls to the 
compression functioll. This is roughly twice as expensive as the Joux technique 
which builds a 2k-collision of messages of the same length using k x 21L / 2 calls to 
the compression function. The reason for the difference is that in Joux's attack 
each colliding message pair st.arts from the same hi anel wc arc fiueliug a collision 
within oue set, whereas here we need to find collisions bet.ween twu sets, one 











Remark 6.3.3. There i~ llO reasoll why we caullot u~e distinct message blocks 
u, b, c, ... , z iustead of repeats of the message block (j whell building the expand-
able lllessage. This lllay allow for more Hexibility in t.he format of the secoud 
prcilll<l!!,c that we eventually find. However, it may not be entirely possible to 
lW:Lke the secollc.l preiruage llleaningful due to the fact that \ve are forced to use 
ouly a few cOlllponellts of the expandable message (c.lependillg on the bit pattem 
of 0: - k) and, as we will see in the next sectioll, a is ouly determined after the 
expandable lllessage has been built. 
6.3.3 Using expandable messages to find second preIm-
ages 
Let M/ rugf / be all extrelllely long messa.ge of 2k + k + 1 messa.ge blocks. Attempting 
to find a second preimage, NI', by using the long-message attack described in 
Section 6.2 will not. work because Merkle-Dalllgctrd streugthelling eusures that 
the final length fields of }'l/(I1"!Jd and I'v!' are different. aud therefore M/al"!Jd and 
J\j' almost certainly do not llash t.o the sallle final value. However, cOlllbilling the 
long-message attack with an expandable message circumvent.s Merkle-Damgard 
strengthening by constructing a second pl'eilllage Al jurwd of the same length as 
M/"rycl' The attack works as follows: 
Step 1 Start with a long message, M/,U"gct, that is 2k + k + 1 blocks long, and 
compute its intermediate hash values hi, h2 ,· .. ,h2k+ k . 
Step 2 ?-.Iake a (k, 2k - 1 + k) expandable meSS(lge using the procedure outlined 
above. (Recall that an expandable message is a set of 2k possible messages, 
all of which collide on the penultimate chaining value). The expandable 
message call start from auy chosen initial value ho, and we denote the end 
hash chaining value of the expandable message by h *. 
Step 3 Carry out the loug messa.ge attack on }'l/argct, but starting from the 
end of the expandable message constructed in Step 2. In other words, 











{k -I- 1, / .. + 2, ... ,21. -I- /,;}, where h} is Olle of the intermediate dmillillg 
values of A11[II'Y"" (The illtermediate hash values lio, hI"'" hI. ueed to be 
excluded when searchiug for (nliIL!,: because the expandable message from 
Stcp 2 has n llliuiulUlll message leugth of k blocks). 
Step 4 Now use the expandable message to produce a message M* of j - 1 
blocks, so that M "11IntiILk is a message of j blocks which cau replace the 
first j blocks of M/al'gct without affecting the intermediate hash values from 
h j ouwards. 
Step 5 Return a second preimage lHj'()(wd where 
\Ve now have two messages, !YltuI'yct and 1I1/ou"d: of the same length, whose final 
lengt.h fields arc thlls the same, and which therefore hash to the same final val1H~. 
Work 
The compression function is put to use at three different stages in the process 
above: iu Step 1 when the intermediate hash values are computed, in Step 2 
wheu the expaudable message is constructed, and iu Step 3 during the search for 
filii,,!,·. Addiug together the number of calls at each of these stages gives us the 
total work: 
L' S., Step :3 
;::tep 1 tep:' ~
~. '" , ()" 
(2'" + k) + k X 2"/2+1 + 21. + ---. 
21. + k 
Siuee !.: « 2"', we regard k as negligible and t.his simplifies to 
The longer the target lllt'S:'mge the lllOre efficient the attack relative to a bmte 
force attack, uutil k is so large that that the k x 2,,/:2+1 term dominates the 2"-1. 
terlll, at which poiut the work to fiud the expalldable message becomes grcater 












It is possible to allow the second preillmge to have the first few hundred or thou-
saud lllessages the same as the target message. We just start the expandable 
message frotu the illtenuccliate value just after t.he last desired identical message 
block, instead of hom lio. 
\Ve cau also coustruct a. secoud preimage to have the last few huudred or thou-
sand lllessage blocks the same as the target message. In this case we start from 
ho, allCi we restrict the intermediate hash states that can be reached with tnlink 
tu the hash st ates occurring before the first of t.he desirably ident.ical message 
blot'ks gets processed by the cOlllpression function. 
6.4 The herding attack 
Previollsly mentioned uses of hash fUllctiolls include proof of prior knowledge and 
t'Ulllluitlllent tu a secret whilst keeping the secret hiddeu. In 2006 John Kelsey 
awl Ta(iayoshi Kohno [KK06] presentnd an attack Oil :\1crklc-Dmng(\rd hash func-
tiom in which they find a preimage of a desired form without much more effort 
than fillding a t'ollision. 
Consider the followiug scenano: Ned, a modem-day Nostradamus, claims 011 
day D j to klluw the closing prices of gold (Pl ), brent crude oil (P'2) and platinulll 
(Pa) according to some or other financial index all Det'ember 31, 2008. He also 
claims to know the outcome of certain ot.her events that have not yet come to 
fruitioll. On this day, D J , Ned claims that the hash value under F of all of this 
illful"lllation (stock prices and other) is h'. We aSSLlme F to be a 'good' hash 
function in the sellse that its output is large enough to defeat preimage attacks; 
let the 01ltput be a bit string of size u. On January 1, ~009, Ned produces a 












The C}l1('stioll we need to consider is whether or not we have sufficient (~vid()ncc 
to conclude that Ned did indeed know the value of H, ?2 alld P'J at time 1)1' If 
not, then it would seem that Ned would have to know how to find a preimage of 
h* uncler F. However, given that the output of F is large, and assuming that the 
best preirnage attack on F is a brute force attack, then this seems highly unlikely. 
The attack provided by Kelsey and Kohno actually violates a less well-known 
property of hash fUllctions known as Chosen Target .Porced Prefix (CT},P) preinl-
auc resistance. This property reads as follows: 
Property 4. Chosen Target Forced Prefix preimage resistance 
A hash function F' is said to be GTFP preirnaue r-esistant iffm' a value Ii: chosen 
hy the attacker, and fa,. a given preji:E P (specified after II *is chosen), it is 
r:ornputrdir)// ally inffasiblf to .find M such that F (P II M) = h * . 
The attack makes use of repeated application of a collision finding algorithm on 
F and thus shows that applications such as cOlnrnitment schemes which were 
previously thought to be unrelated to collision resistance, are no longer as secure 
as previously hoped. 
Before the attack is described, we introduce the concept of a diamond stmc-
tu.re. This is essentially a cleverly devised data structure that allows us to 'herd' 
allY givell lJrefix to a certain hash value by walking dOWll the branches of the 
diamond. It is this 'herding' ability that gives the attack its name. For a param-
eter k, the diamond structure produees a 2k multi-collision in a rather different 
lllauner hom that of JOllX [Jou04]. Figure 6.10 depicts a diamond struetme with 
k = 3. We use the hash function's IV, lio, and apply the cOlIlpression funetion f 
of F to 2k distinct Ulessage blocks tnOi for i froUl 1 to 2k. We then have 2k inter-
lllediate hash values hI i for i frolIl 1 to 2k. We now search for distinct message 
blocks nili and mli+1 such that f(h 1i , Inli) = f(h1(i+J), ITil(i+I)) = h2!.±l. (say) for 
2 
i E {1,3,5, ... ,2k -l}, creating a "subdiamond" (ho,hli,h2'tl,hl(i+I),ho). By 












Figme 6.10: Diamond structure with k = :3 
to the compressioll fuuction. Wc repeat this process for the pairs h'2i' h'2(i+l) for 
odd i, obtailliug; 2k - 1 larger diamonds, (Ito, h'2i' h;j!±!, h'2(i+l)l fLo). We contiuue to 
2 
do this ulltiJ we reach a final hash value h* (whieh is published by the attacker). 
Sillce every (;(lllision doses a suhdimllond haUl ho, und there are 2k - 1 sub-
diamonds ill our diamond stmcture (oue for each pair of adjaceut moi, lItO(i+l))' 
the expected total work for this construction is 
calls to the compressioll function. 
We are llOW ill the position to "herd" F. Note that the <tttacker does not choose 
h'; this value is dependent on the diamond structure. 
6.4.1 Herding without Merkle-Damgard strengthening 
We first ignore MprkJe-Darngard strengthening and herd F by doing the following: 
Step 1 At time Dl we build a diamond structure and detenninc the value h* 











Step 2 At tillle LJ'2 we gain knowledge of the prefix P = I\ IIP:zll· .. IIR. This 
constit1ltes the first part of om prediction. (In Xed's case, he obt.ains the 
valtw p], P'2 aud 1~3). We feed P through F to get all intermediate hash 
Step 3 \Ve search for a linking message block Iii/ink, that when appended to 
P and fed through F, yields one of the intermediate hash values ill our 
dialllond, i.e., we feed random messages Inlink into f(h trnp ,') until we find 
one whose output is olle of the I:~=o 2i = 2k+l - 1 intermediate hash values 
in the diamond structure we expect to try about 2" /2k+1 = 2,,-k-l 
messages bdol'e finding m'link. See figure 6.11. 
p 
Figure 6.11: Herding without .\Ierkle-Damgard strengthening 
Step 4 After we have found fnlink and hji such that f(h tmp , mlink) = hji' we pro-











blocks as we \vnlk dowu the bl'HIlClies of the diHllloud frotn It)i to h*. We 
!lUW Imvc it lucssagc Ai = })111 .. . III~lllnli"kIIM' such that F(/'vl) = h .... 
n\' followil1g th!' pl'ncecltll'c outliued above, we iJre able to first cOll1mit to a hash 
value h· <lull tbell prod\lce a lllessage which starts with auy giveu prefix, ?, aut! 
Ittl:ibes tu 11.+. See figlll'C 0.11. The message M = PllmlilLklllll;jl hashes to It'. 
6.4.2 Herding with Merkle-Darngfll'd strengthening 
There arc two possible ways to deal with tvlerkle-Daruganl strengthening. One 
way illvol ves 1'Illllliug the algorithm as gi veu above, and thell appeudillg a (1, k)-
expandable message (sec Section 'tt) to the end of the dialllolld stnldUl'e. This 
ellSlll'US that all possible lllessages built lIsing the diallloud structlll'e can still be 
m<t<k to have the same leugth, and henee to produce the same value when fed 
through a hash fnnetion that employs Merkle-Darngard strengthening. The other 
!JossilJilit.y involves choosiug m'ink by only eOllsiderillg values h Ji ill the widest 
layer of the diamond struetme: We would need to know an upper bOUlld for IPI 
befure we start say, I blocks. Theil we can ensure the final luessage block is 
I +- It: + 1 bloeks loug by ehoosing the length of m/ink appropriately aud only search-
iug for f(h/ IILJl , m/ind ill the widest layer of the dialllolld. Of course ill this ease 
after we find the limti hash h* of the diamolld we will publish f(h*, lenyth-jidd) 
as uur hasI! value. 
Work 
Th(~ work nccd(~d to 1'1111 the attack withoHt l\I(~rkle-Damg<ird strcngtJwning can 
be broken down as follows: 
(6.1 ) 
We c()llsidm the work ueeded to eomplete st.eps 2 aud 4 to be negligible. 










all expandable message is 
Step 1 StUI' :1 StuI' • ----.. ~~
2,,/HI.:-rl +_ :t,-h:-l + k X 211/'2+1 (6.2) 
The work described for Step * is what is needed to build n (1, /,; )-oxpalldable 
Illessage (see Sectioll Tn· 
TlIt) work ueeded to rUIl the attack with Merkle-Dalug£mJ strellgthenillg awl 
using the widest layer of the diawond only is approximately 
(6.3) 
To lllinimize the total work needed for the attack, we set the work needed for 
building the diamond structure equal to the work needed for finding mUftk (so 
that neither phase forms a "bottleneck"), and we solve for k. (Step * reqUlres 
llluch less work than Step 1, awl can be ignored.) In the case of 6.1 




II - 2 
k= -4-. 
In the case without IVlerklc-Darngard strengthening, the work required is approx-
imately 2"-1.: since we have considereel both terms of 0.1 to contribute equally to 
the work. If for example F is MD4 (see Section 4.4.2 and [Riv92aJ) and we run 
this version of the attack, then 
k = 128 - 4 = 124 ~ 31. 
4 4 
Therefore, the ,vork required to find a preimage under MD4 is roughly 2128-31 = 
2!J7. Although this is still too large for the attack to be practical, it is llluch better 
than the 21:18 work required for a brute force preimage attack. 
Remark 6.4.1. If it is possible to predetermine the set of possible prefixes. then 
the dialllond structure can be built by using these in its widest layer, i.e., as the 
mh. In this case, the total work for the attack is comprised only of the alllount 











lltHwu'k o.4.~, If Ute cqllhii!)l1~ alc fuund ll:Jillg the hil'lbdiiY attack, tlwll the 
,lltackel call r:h(Ju~t~ hi" II/i) tu be HWHuiugful IlltlS1"'age bloeks. 
SOllle applications uf this ntiack llwlltiolled ill [KKOO] iudllde stun\iug credit for 
iuV<'utioUH, llwdificatioll of sigHud dUCUlllcut::; HlHlrallduUl Humber tixillgl. 
Example 6.4.1. \Ve llOW exhibit the herding attack using BABI. We let fJ = 457 
alld we let II = 2:i3. Mes::Jage blocks are eight bits loug, i.e., one ASCll dmmcter, 
amI all chainiug values are six bits long. Assul11e that a week agu we elaillled to 
kuow wllHt the stock prices of gold, brent crude oil aud platiuulll would be toda.y. 
We illsu claimed to knuw the outcome of certaiu eveuts that ute to happeu ill 
the distallt flltllle. As prouf of this knowledge, we presented the hash value h". 
We claimed that this was the hash value of all the inforlllatioll under BAtH amI 
we did Hot lise l\I()l'kle-Dt1l11g~ll"(l strengtheuiug. Of COUl"::;e, one week ago we had 
llU idea what. the !>ituck prices were. We followed the steps outlilled tI.bove and 
st f\l·t(~rl by h1lildillg the diamond structure displayed ill figmc G.12 (which t.ook 
tl1lt~c collisiullS). 
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Figure 6.12: DiHlllowl structuru with k = 2 
1 Alin' awl Holl wish to play (l gallle that rl'llilires thel1J t.o agrt~e Oil (L certaill seqllellce of 











A millute ago we gained kllowledg(~ of the relevant ~tock prices: t.he pl'ice of gold 
is g, the price of oil it; 0 awl the price of platilllllll is p. \Ve compute the ill-
t.elllwciiate chniuillg value, h:; = 001000, by feeding gllolip through BAB!. Note 
that the message luugth is iguOl"ed. We theu COilS icier roughly 20 - 2 = Hi calldi-
date 1l1eStiage blocks nnd fiud that the BleSHage block n liukH how h:j to the third 
cliailJill!!, value, 010111, ill the widest layer of our dialllond. See figure 6.1~3. 
r-
ho = 000000 
111111 ~b 
~O10001~ 
ellollp n 000111' ~ 
lOlDle( 
101111 t 
Figllre 6.13: Herding BABl 
If we pass Ai = gJloJJpJJnJJelJv as input to BABI, we see that the hash value, hu, 
without takillg message length into account, is 111100 = h*. Hence, we have 
succe~sfully herded BABl. The issue of' length cau be easily resolved: We kllOW 
that til(' input to BABI will be five message blockH (assuming we only look for 
f(II:;. Ifl/ink) alIlong the widest layer of the intermediate hash values). Thus, frotH 
h * we .iust hash the appropriate length field and obtain the hash value to be 
published. 
Remark 6.4.3. III [1<K06], Kelsey and Kohno mentioll that the diamolld call be 
built more efficiently with work 2"/'2 + k/2 + 2. In what follows, we assume this 











6.5 Conlbining herding and the long-nlessage at-
tack 
III this sectioll we describe Ull attack iJy Audreeva et at. [A13F+08j. It cOlllbines 
the herdillg attack of Kelsey and 1<.11ouo [1<.K06] with the secoud pre1uHtge at-
tack of Kelsey and Schneier [K805] to produce a different long-message second 
preilllage attack all iterated hash fUllctions. As will be seen, this attack requires 
slightly lllore work than is needed for the second preilllage attack of Kelsey and 
Schueier. However, this at.tack is abo applicable to a Merkle-D(tIng~ircl variant, 
nmnely dithel'ed hash fuw.:t'iuns, whereas the attack by Kelsey and Schueier is 
IlOt. (The applicatioll of this attack to dithered hash fuuctions will be described 
ill Chapter i), Siuce the herding attack and the Kelsey-Sdllleier attack have 
both beell described previollsly, we skip over their details aud Illove straight into 
destTibillg the combined attack. 
For ,1 hHsh fUllct.ioll F, we start with a target message A1/ aryd , where lHtaryd 
is ulade IlP of '2' lllessage blocks; M = !ntllm211., .1I,fl,21_11I1n21 auci 1"(M) = 11,2" 
We do the followillg: 
Step 1. We build a directed diamond structure of depth w (Le., there are 2W 
illtenllediate hash states ill the diamond's widest layer), such that all pos-
sible paths of w message blocks lead from the IV flo to the value h·, For 
COllstructioll of the dialllond see Section 6.4, 
Step 2. \Ve search for a. linkillg message block, Tnlink, that connects h' to aile of 
the iutenlletiiate hash values produced dming the cOlllPutation of F( MtClT'yct) ' 
We do this by raudolllly cOllsiderillg options for tn/ink until f (h *, 1Il·/ink) = hi 
for SOllle w + 1 ::; i ::; '21. 
Step 3. We generate it prefix, P, of si~e i - w - 1 blocks such that P hashes 
fWlll Ito to one of the 2W hash values in the widest layer of om diamond 












Step 4. \V(~ output the message ;\]' = PIIDllmlinl.:llmi+lll .. ·llm~l. 
The messages M((Jl'Yf:t aud 1\1' hash to the same value under F. They are both of 
the same leugth and therefore still hash to the same value when Merkle-Dalllgard 
strellgthellillg is applied. III the event that i = 21, 110 message blocks of Ivl will 
be llsed in AI'. 
Work 
Building the diamond in Step 1 requires 2,,/2+w/2+2 work [KS05]. Finding Tnlink 
in Step 2 requires roughly 2,,-1 work, and Step 3 requires roughly 21l - W work. 
Therefore, the total work for the attack amounts to 
This is lllillil1liz(~d when w = (n-2)/3 [ABF+08], so the total work is 5·2¥+2n- w. 
Although this attnck is slightly lllore expensive than the Kelsey-Schneier attack, 
it does allow the attacker more flexibility when constructing M' because he has 
more control over P than the attacker has over the expandable message in the 
Kelsey-Schneier attack, and can therefore make P meaningful. 
Finally we !late that part of this attack can be viewed as a new way of con-
structing expandable messages. A prefix of the appropriate length is selected and 
theu connected to the first level of a diamo!ld, from where it is herded to h*. 
The work required to do this is 2n/2+w/2+2 + 2"-W where w is the depth of the 
diaulOud. This Illethod is more flexible than thc technique described in Section 
























6.6 ~rhe poisoned block attack 
It frcqllently lIsed to be argued that collisioll attacks were inulevallt ill real ap-
plicat.iolls because colliciiug lIlessages produced by most practical attacks (such 
as the uiH'el'elltiai attack by Wallg et at [WGLY04]) are w;ually llleaniugiess, i.e., 
the attacker has little control over the colliding blocks he finds. The poisoued 
block attack, however, allows us to use a random collision on the compression 
fUllctioll of all itemted hash function to construct a llleaningful eollision un the 
hash fUllction. 
CUllsider all iterative ha,sh fUllction F and its cumpression fUIlction f. Assume 
then~ cxi::;ls a cullisiuu-finuiug algorithlll C that, given some chaining value h, pro-
duces two distinct message blocks, m and m', such that f(lI, m) = f(h, m'). Ac-
cordillg; to the l\Icl'kk-DnmpJird COllstruction, for a messag;e M = InllllfL:2I1·· .llmi, 
\ve have hi = f(hi-1,lni), where ho is the lV of the hash function. In the poi-
sOiled blo('k at.tack Wf~ fix some j E {O, 1, ... , t} Hnd l'llll C in order to find two 
lIlessage blocks Nand N' such that f(h j , N) = f(h j , N'). We nuw llotice that 
the twu messages 
aud 
collide under F. The blocks Nand N' may be meaningless, but they are now 
part uf longer messages that can be carefully cOllstructed so as tu illCOIlSpicuotlsly 
illcorporate them. 
Example 6.6.1. We do not break BABI using the poisoned block attack. This 
is because BAHl has been designed to take ill silllple messages frum the consule, 
i.e., tlw program cannot process files. Instead, we provide an example by Magnus 
Damn and Stefan Lucks [DL05] that aptly demonstrates the effectiveness uf the 











Damll awl Lllcks provide two postscript files that ha:-;11 to the SflllJC value uu-
d(T .:vIDS. ()Il!~ of t.he filcs is a letter of recommendation for a11 ('vii employee 
Alice. <lml the other is n letter gnl.lltiug Alice access to secret dOetUUellts. III 
short, AliCf~ gets bel' boss, Bob, to sigH the Jetter of recollllIleutiatioH, thereby 
providing her with a digital siguatlll'e for t.he letter grClntiug her access. 
The exalllple luakes IlS(~ of the following postscript cOllstruction: 
(Rd(R'2) eq {instruction set l}{instruction set 2} ifelse. 
This syntax commands the execution of instruction set 1 if HI = H2 and the ex-
ecution of iustmction set 2 otherwise. Assume that instruction set 1 cOlluflautis 
the display of the letter of reconlluelldatiou for Alice, aud that instruction set 2 
COlllllHtnds the display of the letter granting Alice access to privileged iufol'lllation. 
Alice ulakes lIse of the differential attack on l\ID5 by XiaoYIl11 Wang and Hongbo 
Yu [WY05j2 to find HI and H'2 such that HI i H'2 and I\1D5(Rt) = MD5(R2)' 
The attacker has little control over the messages RI aud R'2, so they will prob-
ably look like meauingless garbage. Alice is now in a position to produce two 
dOCulllellts 
D (R'2) (R'2) eq {instruction set 1}{ iustl'llctioll set 2} ifelse and 
D' (R 1)(H'2) eq {instruction set l}{instruction set 2} ifelse, 
such that. ~fD5(D) = IvlD5(D'). The postscript code for both documents is in-
cluded in Appeudix B. DocUlllellt D is the letter of recolIuuendatioll, and Viis 
the letter granting Alice access to secret docUlllents. Both D aud D' hcLSh to 
a25f7fOb2geeOb3968c860738533a4b9 under IvlD5. 
Alice seuds D to Bob and requests a digital signature. When Bob opens D 
he sees the letter of recolIllnelldation and SigHS it using the siguature sc:herne re-
Jiallt on MD5. Due to the collision of D and V' under MD5, this signature is also 











valid for lJ'. Alice may HOW pn~sellt D' ac.:eompanicd with a valid siguatmc. 
Although H) alld H2 are meaningless (see Appendix B), the exploitation of the 
. if-thull-else' eOllstl'lletioll in the postscript language allows for these Illecwillg-
less, cullidiug elemellts to produee u very l1leaniugful collisioll. Of eourse, the 
deeeptioll is easily det.ected IIPOll direet exarnillatioll of the somee code. How-
ever. ill praetiee, programs interpreting advaueed doeulllellt languages such as 












Generic Attacks on Some 
Merkle-Damgard Variants 
III respOllse to the generic attacks 011 iterated hash fuuctiow; described in the 
previous chapter, ::ieveral variatiolls of the classical Merkle-Damgard construction 
have beell suggested ill the hope of impl'Ovillg security. We HOW present some 
of these variants, amI show that security against HlUlticullisiOlu; is nut signifi-
cantly improved by the suggested modifications. This means, for example, that 
cascading these hash functions does Hot improve their security against collisions. 
7.1 Generalised Sequential Hash Functions 
JOllX'S multicollisioll attack [Jol104] obtains a 2k-collision on a classical iterated 
hash function with only slightly more effort than finding an ordinary 2-collision; 
this raises the question of how the Merklc-Damgfud construction might be modi-
fied so as to prevent the multicollision attack. A natural approach is to try using 
message blocks more than once. Nandi and Stinson considered this approach in 
[NS04], ill which they defined a more general class of hash functions called gen-
crali8ed sequential hash functiuns, and immediately showed that it is possible to 
llmlmulticollisions on this class of hash fUllctions efficiently if each message block 
is used at most twice in cOlllPuting the hash. Hoeh and Shamir [HS06a] extended 











which IllCssage blocks are processed more than twice, thus ruling out this class 
of hash fUllctions as a suitable replnCClllCllt for the lVl(~rkle-Dal1lg;tr(1 construction. 
vVe define generalised sequeutial hash functions now: 
Let f be a compression fUllction. \Ve defiue a hash function F based on f as 
follows: For every possible message length of l blocks, we define a sequence at = 
(ni, n~, ... , a~) of length 8, where each a; E 5 t = {1, 2, ... , l} and each number iu 
51 appears in 0:1 at least once (so 8 2': l). To hash a message M = mlllm211· . ·llml 
we compute 
i=1,2, ... ,8, 
where ho is an initial value and where h" the final hash value F( M). (See figure 
7.l.) We refer to m.nlllmnJI ... lima, as the expanded me88aye. 
~ ~ 
lio -[ZJ-hl- [ZJ-h'2-
Figure 7.1: A hash function based au the sequence a 
This construction processes each message block at least once, iu au order deter-
mined by the sequence ai, whereas the classical construction uses each message 
block exactly Ollce. If the sequence ci is the sequence \{J(1,l) = (1,2, ... , l), i.e., 
0; = i for i = 1,2, ... ,1, then we get the classical Merkle-Damgard construction. 
If rtl is \jJ(2,1) = (1,2, ... , l, 1,2, ... , l), then each message block is processed in 
order exactly twice. If 0 1 is the sequence et described in section 2.7, then each 
block is still process(~d twice, hut in a different order. Note that JOllX'S rnlliticolli-
sial! attack will 110 longer work, because a pair of message blocks m; and m; that 
collide on f(h;,') will almost certainly not collide on f(h j ,.) when the message 











7.1.1 Nandi and Stinson's attacks 
l\'andi and Stinson describe two methods for finding k-collisions on a generalised 
seqnclltial hash fuuction ill lNSU4]: thc first works if the sequellce () eOlltaiw; a 
loug euough chaill, nud the second works if 110 tenns appe,u's ill n lllore than 
t\vice auJ (} cont.ains all iuitial iuterval in which enough tenus appear ouly ouce. 
Tlwy theu prove thnt if the hash functiou is based 011 sequences 0,1 with frequeucy 
at lllost 2, theu I cnu be chosen so that at least. oue of the attack methods call 
be applied. 
The first Nandi and Stinson attack 
Th<: irl('~ of the first at.tack is t.o irlentify k message blocks that. form a chain, and 
then to vary only these message blocks to find a sequence of k iutel'llal collisions 
which can be pasted together ill different ways to form a multieollisioll. This 
attack works, for example, 011 hash fUllctiollS F based on the sequence 8 1. We 
describe it usiug 
05 < 1 'J 1 3 ') 4 3 r; 1 r: > ';:-J == ,_" ''"'' , ,v~( ,iJ . 
We denote the compression function by f. 
Step 1 We identify 1 -< 3 -< t) as a longest chain ill 8 5 , and \ve let k = 
lllaxchain(85 ) = 3. (In general, ll1axchain(81) = lltl J, see section 2.7). 
This means that all occurrences of 1 ill 8 5 occur before all occunellces of 
3, which occur before all OCClll'rences of 5. This allows us to break the se-
quence 8 1i into three sections, each of which contains only vne of {I, 3, 5}. 
So the computation of the hash can be split into three stages in such a way 
that message blocks (fI,l, In;j and Tr/'5 are each llsed in only one stage. We will 
find a collision at the end of each stage by varying only one of the lllessage 
blocks fILl, Tn:l aud 1fL5 at a time. 
Step 2 We choose a mndom block Z and set In') allcirn,j equal to Z. 












I.e., the expanded lllcssages InlllZllrn'l and 1I1,~ IIZllm; collide Oil the third 
chaiuiug value starting from ho· 
Step 4 We apply another birthday attack to find two distinct blocks m.3 awl m~~ 
sLlch that 
I.e., tlw expanded messages 1II'311ZIIZllm3 and rn;IIZIIZIITn~~ collide on the 
fourth chaiuing value starting from hu. 
Step 5 We apply a final iJirthday attack to find two distinct blocks m5 and rn~ 
sllch that 
i.e., the expanded messages ln511Zllm1j and m~IIZllm~ collide Oil the third 
chainiug value starting froIll hb' 
FiuallY we build a 23-multicollision for the hash function based on 8 5 by pasting 
together the message block collisions produced in steps 3, 4 and 5: the colliding 
messages are miIIZllm:~IIZllrn5' where mi cau be either mi or rr( For a schematic 
rcpresclltatioll of this attack, see figure 7,2. 
mlZml maZZrn3 m'1j Zm5 
~~~
ho hu hb he 
~~~
rr.' Z.,n' "5 [j 
Fig\ll't' 7.2: A 23-111ulticoltisiou for the hash fUllctioll based on g1j 
Work 
In order to find a 23 -collision on the hash function based on 8 5 we run k = 3 
birthday attacks. The first and third birthday attack find a collision between 











fUllctioll fur each cHlldidate lllCssnge, nud we expect to nued at most 2.5 x 2/L/'2 
candidate messages (see Chapter 5). So, the tot.al work for these birthday attacks 
is ~l x 2.5 x '2"/'2 calls to the compressioll fUllction. The secoud birthday attack 
illvol yes four calls to the eompressiou fUllction for each candidate message, ami 
therdore takes about 4 x 2.5 X '2"/'2 calls to f. So the total expected llumber of 
calls to f is at most 
In general, for a hash function based on 8 1• we can find a 2k-collision by choosing 
l = 21,; - 1 (so that maxchain(81) = lit] J = k) aud I'uullillg I,; birthday attacks, 
ill total calliug the curupressioll fUllctioll about 2.5 x 211 /'2 x 1811 tillles. Silll:e 
1<:-)11 = 2l, this is 5l x '2 11 /'.!. times, which is 0(1,;'211/'2). 
Geueralizillg the above attack in a llatmal way results in the followiug theorem: 
Theorem 1.1.1. [NS04] Let F be a genemlized sequential hash function bused 
on (l Sf:ljUenCe ct such that maxcfwin( a)= 1,;. Thel'e exists an attack on F that 
pl'Odu.ces a 'i' -wllision in e:cpected time O( s2/L/:2) , where ,'j = 1 Q I. 
\Ve also note that for classical iterated hash functiolls, Q = \]f(1,I) and a maximum 
lengt h chain is 1 -< 2 -< :3. .. -< l, so in the first Nandi and Stinson attack we 
would fine! all internal collision for each interlllediate hash value by varying each 
lllessage block. Thus the attack reduces to the Joux llluiticollision attack in this 
case. 
The second Nandi and Stinson attack 
The above attack method does not work against the "doubly iterated" hash func-
tiol1 based 011 w(:.I,l), Iwr.allsc lllaxc:hain(w(:l,I))= 1 (so the attack produces a 2-
collision and is 110 better than the birthday attack). In the saIne paper [NSO{l] 
Nandi and Stinson give a different method of attack that produces a 2k-collision 
for it hash fuuctioll based 011 the sequeuce n l = \]f(:.J,I). vVe call this hash function 
]i' ami label its com pressioll fUllction f. In order to find a I,;-collision (where 











Step 1 We first choose the length l of the 2'" colliding messages we arc going to 
fiud, hy settillg; 
t = IlL -+~ + In In2k1 
I 2 2111 2 
awl letting 1 = kt. (We will see shortly that for this t n birthday attack 011 
11 set of 21 elements succeeds with probability 1 - .}",.) 
Step 2 We then apply JO\lX'S llllliticollision attack to a. hash function based on 
the first half of oJ (i.e., the ordinary hash function based on \{I(l,I)), to obtain 
l pairs 
such that 
i = 1,2, ... ,l. 
We !lOW have a 21-collisio!l on this hash function and a collision set 
i.e., we have 21 I-block messages of the form Inrllm~ll ... llmi that collide on 
every interlllediate chaining value from ho to hI. 
Step 3 We 1l0W divide the remaining index interval [l+l, 2/] into k consecutive in-
tervals of t elelllents each, and we search for a collision all each of these inter-
vals: in other words, for each i from 1 to k, we search among the 2t messages 
lIL(i-l)l+lllm(i_l)I+:.!II· .. Ilm;t for two (say Mi and Mf) that take hl+(i-l)t to 
h'-t--il. (Kote that we can use the tree structure of these 21 lllessages to find a 
collision between them (ifit exists) with only 2+2:'!+2:3+ .. . +2t = 2(21-1) 
calls to the cOlupression function - two calls to find the two possible values 
of h'+(i-l)t+l = f(hl+(i-I)t, m(i-I)t+l)' four calls to find the two possible val-
ues of h'+(i -1)1+:'! starting froUl each of these, and so on.) 












Step 4 If all l.: birthday attu,cks ill the pl'eviolls step sllcceed, then pasting to-
gether the t~ollisiolls yields n set of 2'" llwssnges of the forlll 111 t II At III· .. II At k 
that collide all each of the first l clmiuiug values, ami then iu every ttl! chaiu-
iug value stmtillg a t hi, including the final value h'2l. III other words, the 
set 
provides a 2"'-collision for a hash function based all \[1(2,1). III the diagram 
below, k = 0 and t = 2, hence l = 6. 
Figure 7.:~: A i'-collision for the hash function based on \[1(2,1) 
\Vork 





~ ilL + 1 h.lln2kl t- --+~--
2 21u2' 
2t ;::;; n + 1 + log'2 (In 2k) , 
so the success probability for each attack is approximately 
1 - to ~ In 2'" = 1 _ ~. 
2k 
The probability that. all k birthday attacks succeed is therefore 











The expected work for the lHlllticollision attack in Step 2 is at most 2.5tk2,,/2 
(sim·C' it requires finding tk collisions, each of which can be expected to take at 
most 2.52"/2 calls to the compression function). In Step 3, the tree-structure of 
the '2t possible messages in each interval means that finding a collision between 
them (if it exists) takes 2(21 - 1) calls to f. Therefore, the work required for all 
k birthday attacks is about 2k2 t , assuming they all succeed. 
Step 3 is dependant on Step 2; if Step 3 fails, Step 2 has to be repeated. Since 
Step 3 succeeds with probability greater than ~, we expect steps 2 and 3 to be 
repeated at most twice (using a geometric distribution argument), and the overall 
average case complexity of the attack is upper bounded by 
Since tis 8(n+1111nk) and 2t = 2"il ·2~log2(l1l2k) = 2"il .(ln2k)~ is 8(2n/2(lnk)~), 
the overall expected complexity of the attack is O(k(n + In k)21!/2). 
Generalising this second attack in a natural way gives the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.1.2. Let ex be a sequence of length s on symbols {I, 2, ... , l}. Ass'urne 
that the following hold: 
1. frcq(ex) ::; 2, and 
5.! then~ is some initial interval ex[l, 'IV] of ex in which there are kt syrnbols which 
appear exactly once, wher'e t = rCn + 1)/2 + (In In 2k)/(2In 2)1. 
Then there e:rists an attack on any n-bit hash function based on a that pT'Od'uces 
a 2k -collision in expected time O(s In k21!/2). 
The attack works as follows. We choose kt "active" indices i ::; 'IV such that ex; 
appears only once in a[l, 'IV]; the conesponding active message blocks are used 
exactly once in the first 'IV calls to the compression function; after that (since 











eX(lctl,V ouce lllOl'C, We call them active blocks because they arc the only bloeks 
\w willlw varyiug to obtain the Ululticollisiou; we set all other Illessage blocks to 0, 
\Ve 1>('gi1l by finding a 2-collisioll f(h i - 1 , In;) = f(lI i - 1 , Tn:) = hi for each of 
the active iudices j, This also involves evaluatiug the eOlllpressioll fUllctiou for 
the iuactive lllessage bloeks, awl takes tilIle O((w - kt) + kt2 I ), (This gives 
us 2"1 I-block messages which collide on the Hrst w chaining values, and out of 
these we Heed to Hull 21,; that collide on the final hash value hs .) We can divide 
the remaiuing interval [w,.s] into /;; - j intervals each containing at least t active 
lllessage blocks. We now search for a collision on each of these intervals alIlong 
the (at least) 21 possibilities provided by choosing lfLi or m: for each of the ac-
tive blocks ill t.he interval. If this birthday attack succeeds theu it takes time 
0(21) (using tlw tree-structure of the messages) plus the tillle taken for evalu-
ating the cOlllpression fUll(;tioll OIl the inaetive lllessage blocks in that iuterval, 
awl we are left with two possibilities for that set of (at least) t active blocks. If 
one of these k - j birthday attacks fails then we need to go back and Hnd differ-
ent collisions for those active indices, but t has been chosen so that this happens 
with probability less than ~, so we expect to have to run the attack at most twice. 
Once all k - j birthday attacks have sueceeded, we are left with two possibil-
ities for each of the j active blocks that are only used once, and two possibil-
ities for each of /.; - j subsets of the other active blocks. Thus we have found 
2) x 2k - J = 21,; messages which collide on the first w chaining values and all 
k further chaining values, including the final one hs. The attack takes time 
O((w - kt) + kt2I + (k - j)2t + (.s - w - (/;; - j))), which (since kt ::; .s and by 
our choice of t) is 0(81n k2"N). 
We now show that if 0' is any sequence (containing a sufficiently large num-
ber of s!'mbols) with freq(O') ::; 2, then either the conditions of Theorem 7.1.1 or 
the couditions of Theorem 7.1.2 hold. 











2 /01' all .r: E S (i. c., eucry e/e'(Jwnt in S rL]Jpeu'f'S in n, but nut more than twice). 
if I ~ltU, then une of thc fulluwing hulds: 
1. lI/. a:rc/w. in ( 0) ~ U, (XI" 
2. ther(' is S07lle initial inte7"l!al cy[!, w] of 0: in which there aTe v sY'rnbols wh'ich 
appear e:tadly unce. 
Proof. Let lllaxchaill( (Y) = uo. If Uo ~ il, then we are dOlle, so suppose 
110 < 11. Let Vo denote the maxinlUlll number of lIlutually incomparable elements 
in 8; thell by Dilworth's Theorem 2.7.1 there is a chaill decomposition of S into 
Uo chains (i.e., every element of 8 appears ill exactly one of the chains). But every 
chain cOlltaillS at most maxdmill(O:) = Uo symbols, so 181 = l ~ UOUo, aud it fol-
lows that Vo > llu ~ v. It is therefore possible to find v mutually iucomparable 
elemellts in 0, say Xii' Xi~, . , . ,Xi". Let the first occurrence of :rij be at position 
(/j of (" for i = 1, ... ,U, where al < ... < flv' Note that each of the symbols :£i
1 
for j = 1,2, ... ,v - 1 must occur again in the sequence after position (Lv, or we 
would have:r -<:£. Since we kllow everv sYlllbol occurs at most twice in a it t) ll'",: , 
follows that :I:il' :/:i~' ... ,Xi." all occur exactly once in the initial interval a[l, u], 0 
\Ve are now ready to state, and prove, the main result by Nandi and Stinson, 
namely that there is a lIlulti-collision attack for any generalised sequential hash 
function with frequency at most two. 
Theorem 7.1.4. Let F be (L geneTalised sequential hash function based un the 
sequences (0), a 2 , ... ) such that freq(o:l) ~ 2 fUT all I ~ 1. Then fu'!' any k « n 
there exists a TTmlticullisiun attack un F that p7'Uduces a 2k -cullisiun in expected 
time O(k'2ln k(n + In In k)2 11 / 2). 
Proof. Let t = ,(n + 1)/2 + (In In2k)/(2ln2)l, and note that t = O(n + 
lnln k). Let l = h;'2t. By Theorem 7.1.3 one of the following holds: 
1. lIlaxchain(Q)~ k, or 
2. there is some initial interval a[l, w] of Q ill which there are kt symbols which 











if cOllclitioll 1 holds, then b.y Tlwortlm 7.1.1 we call use Naucli rend Stinson's 
first attack tcdmiqllc to obtain it 2k-collision on F ill expected tillle O(S211/~), 
where 8 = lo)j. If condition 2 holds, then by l'heorem 7.1.2 we can use Nandi 
awl Stinson's second attack techllique to obtain a 2"-collision on F iu expected 
time 0 (s In k2";:'} Sillce s S; 2l = 2 I,/,t , both attacks are 0 (1.;'2 In k (n + lulu It) ). 0 
The work hv Nandi nnd Stinson shows that gelleralised seqnential hash functions 
are insecme against. rnulticollision attacks if the message blocks are processed 
at most twite. In fact, Hoch and Shamir show in [HS06a] how to construct a 
lllulticollision if lllessage blocks are processed up to e times for some fixed e. So 
generalised sequential hash functions are not secme against llluiticollisioll attacks. 
7.2 Dithered hash functions 
Dithen~d hash functions were invented by Ron Rivest [RivOS] as a response to 
the second preimage attacks using expandable lllessages, namely, the attack by 
Dean [Dea99], and more recently, the attack by Kelsey and Schueier [K805]. 
These attacks exploit the repetition of the sallle message block to produce second 
pre images with less than the expected brute-force alllount of work. 
The idea behind dithered hashing is to amend the hashing process to include 
an additional input to the compression fUlll:tion. This input is determined by a 
fixed dithering l sequence and aims to put a halt to the use of repetitive compres-
sion function inputs. By umkillg use of a dithering sequellce, the intermediate 
hash value of a message block becomes ciepellciant on the block's position within 
the messagc'. This means t.hat. if the at.tacker finds a collision in the colllpressiotl 
funetion it doesn't help him unless the dithering value is also correct. 
!Tlw terlll rlithfOrmy origill'ltes frolt! the fidd of iltlUge"procl's::;iug. It. refers to t.he represeu-
tatioll uf a variety of gray or (Coloured shades by lllixing together pixels of a ;;lIwlI Humber of 
ba;;ic ~hades. These pixel~ are cOlubiued ralHlolIlly so as t.o prevent distillct putte!'lll:i of cololit' 











Sillce a hash fUllctiol1 ~hould be able to process messages of arbitrary lellgth, 
it is l'C'Hsol1<lhlc' to cOllsiof'r infinite scq1Hmc(~s as calldidates for the dithering; sc~­
queuce d. We let cl be a infiuite word over a finite alphabet A, and deBote the 
ith elelllent of d by rl i . Staying within the Merkle-Dalllgard paradigm, we obtaiu 
a dithered iterated hash fum:tion F by setting 
Figure 7.4 depicts the basic structure of an iterated hash function with dithering. 
III the figure M = lnlll"dl ... 11m/,;. 
l l 
h(l - 0- h]---- [ZJ- h2 - h/,;-l- []J- h/,;=F(fvJ) 
r r r 
el/,; 
Figure 7.t1: Iterated hash function with dithering 
\Ve now discuss va.rious options for dithering: 
Dithering with a counter 
A simple way of dither-iug is to let the dithering sequence d be nothing more than 
1:1 simple l"tullling counter, i.e., 
di = i. (7.1 ) 
Kelsey awl Schlleier suggest this in [KS05]. However, Rivest [Riv05] points out 
that the compressioll function f would need to be able to accept arbitrarily large 
illpnts i since M is allowed to be of arbitrary length. He suggests that it would 
be easier if the dithering input di was restricted to a small finite alphabet. 











cOllstrnctioll by Eli 13ihmn and Orr Dunkelman known as HAIFA [13006]. At 
any time t, the compression fUllction of HAIFA takes in as (tdditional input the 
mllllber of bits hashed up to time t, iucluding the message block t.hat is processed 
by the compression function at tillle t. This is, in essence, identical to the couuter 
dithering schellle with the counter internally tracking the length of the message 
processed thus far. 
Dithering by alternating with O's and 1 's 
Auother fairly simple way to dither is to set 
_ { 0 if i is even, and 
tii -
1 otherwise. 
Although pf[ective in preventing the use of repeated single message blocks, this 
ditheriug sequence does uot prevent the use of repeated pairs of blocks. This will 
not bp of any v(tlue against an adversary that can find fixed "pairs", i.e., message 
block pairs (In!, rrL2) for which fU(hu, tnl), fn'2) = Ito. (This is like the attacker 
treating two message blocks as one block and t"lO iterations of the compression 
function as one function). Also, if the attacker is able to build expandable mes-
sages by using pairs of message blocks, for instance, using a pair of message 
blocks every time a single block is used in the Kelsey-Schneier [1<S05] technique 
(see Section 6.3.2), theu this scheme is of little use. 
Dithering with a pseudorandom sequence 
\Ve could generate a pseudorandom sequence:.; = 81, :';2, ... and set di = 8i for 
all relevant i. However, this would only protect weakly against the use of re-
peated message blocks. The longer the sequence, the more likely the occurrence 
of repeat.iug subsequences; once the cycle of the sequence is found, it Illay be pos-
sible to repeat chunks of message blocks with size ~l (the cycle length) to build 
expandable messages, or even find fixed "chunks", i.e., a collection of message 











Dithering with abelian square-free sequences 
Due to the apparent inadequacies inherent in all of the dithering methods de-
scribed thus far, Hivest [Riv05] suggests the use of an abelian square-free sequence 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.8) for d. These are aperiodic sequences over a finite 
alphabet which have no repeated subwords, and additionally, contain no penuu-
tations of any subwol'd in the sequence. So use of sl1ch sequences prevents an 
attacker from being able to use message block repetition to his or her advantage, 
even b~' repeating a chunk of several blocks. Square-free sequences, i.e., those 
containing no repeat subwords, would work perfectly well as dithering sequences. 
However, Rivest suggests the use of abelinn square-free sequences since they are 
more "repetition-free" tha.n ordinary square-free sequences, and no harder to gen-
crate. 
In [8 i vO.5], Rivest puts forward two dithered hash function proposals that make 
use of ahelian square-fn~e sequences. The first suggests the direct use of the 
Kerii.uen sequence (see Chapter 2, Section 2.8.2) as the dithering sequence, d. 
Dithering inputs are taken frolIl the alphabet A = {a, b, c, d}, and each symbol 
is encoded by two bits: 
a ----> 00, b ----> 01, c ----> 10, d ----> 11. 
The number of bits in each mes::mge block is thus reduced by two bits in order to 
lllake room for the two-bit dither input. Each element of the Ker~i,nen sequence 
can be generated online (symbol by symbol) and can thus be processed efficiently 
by the cOlllpressioll functioll. 
Rivest imposes a slight modification on the scheme suggested above and pro-
poses a second hash function, henceforth refened to as Rep (Rivest's Concrete 
Proposal): For a k-block message NI, each dithering input eli is sixteen bits long 
and has the forlIl 
( 
. 13) 13 d i = 0,/'l,j,zrnod2 I E{O,l}xAx{O,l} , 











Keriinen sequence. In this construction, the next letter of the Keranen sequence 
is only utilized when the couuter j increases by 1 (so /'i,j stays the same for 2J:> 
values of i). This mea.ns that the dithering sequence used in RCP is generated 
213 tillles faster than the Ker~inen sequence. 
The last dithering symbol is slightly different to take care of padding, and has 
the form 
(h = (1, IMI mod Im*l) E {D, 1} x {D, 1 }15, 
where 1m * I denotes the Humber of message bits (as opposed to padding bits) in 
a message block. 
The llse of the last dithering input, dl,;, also eliminates the need for Merkle-
Damgard strengthening because the last dithering symbol depends depends on 
both the number of messages blocks and the number of message bits in the la.st 
block. and will therefore be affected by any change in the message length. 
7.2.1 A second prelmage attack on dithered hash func-
tions 
III this section we describe how Andreeva rot at. [ABF+D8] adapt their secoud 
preimage attack (see Chapter 5, Section 6.5) to work on dithered hash functions. 
Recall that the attack mentioned in Chapter 5 combines the herding attack of 
Kelsey and Schneier [KS05] with the long-message attack described in [:\'1vOV96]. 
This modified attack follows roughly the same procedure, but contains alterations 
to accormnodate for some dithering sequence d. 
When building the diamond, the attacker chooses a dithering symbol for each 
layer in the structure, i.e., for a diamond of depth k he fixes a k-tuple of dithering 
symbols (WI,:.u2, ... , :.uk) (only positions in the long message that use the subse-
quence :.u = WIW2· .. WI,; as dithering symbols will be candidates for him to join 
his diamond to). He also chooses an additional dithering symbol to be used when 












Figure 7.5: Diamond Htruct.nre with k = 3 and uJ = O"rpr5 
For a dithered hash function F, t.he dithering sequence ensures that the hash 
value of a message block is dependant on its position within the message. This 
meallS that our diamond can only be cOllllected to Iv! at the positions where W 
ami rl match. The set of matching positions is givell by 
and the attacker knows R because he knows the dithering sequence d. To ensure 
that R is llOll-empty, W has to be a factor of d, i.e., W1W2, ... , Wk+l has to oceur 
somewhere ill the dithering sequellee. In faet, we would like W to be the most 
frequently occmrillg factor of size k + 1 in d. This is beeause the cost of the attack 
ultimately depellds all the number of message blocks tried when searehillg for a 
message bloek that eOlllleets the diamolld to some intermediate hash value, hi, 
produeed during the eomputation of F(M). The chances that i E R are higher 
if W is the most popular factor of d. 











filld Cl second preimage 1\1' for a target message AdtuI'gct = mlllm~II·· ·llrn~l_lllrn21 
such that F( M) = h'2" The attack proceeds in almost the S!:tllle wny as the 
lludithered attack described ill Section 6.G, which used a diamond structure to 
produce all M' of the forlll M' = PIIDllrnlinkllmi+lll· .. IIm21 which has the same 
lcllgth as AI and hence the same length field. 
To make the attack work against dithered hash functions, we need to make 
sure that when we find our linking message ULlink and hi, the k dithering sym-
bols used just before that, and the dithering symbol used for the calculation of 
rnlinb are the same in both message paths in figure 6.14. So we're going to need 
Wi-h" Wi-k+l, ... ,Wi to be the same as the dithering symbols di - b di - k+1 , ... ,di 
used when constructing the diamond this is the essence of the new attack. 
(The prefix P has the sallle length as the segment of Aitorget before hi, and so 
will automatically have the correct ditherillg sequence.) We do the following: 
Step 1 We select the most papillar (k + 1 )-sized factor of d. We denote this 
fador by w. 
Step 2 We use elements of W as dithering symbols and build a diamond structure 
of depth k, i.e., there are 2k intermediate hash states in the diamond's widest 
layer. All possible paths of k message block and dithering symbol pairs lead 
to the value h*. For construction of the diamond see Chapter 6, Section 
6.4. 
Step 3 \Ve search for a linking message block, Tnlink, that connects h* to one of 
the 2' hash values produced during the computation of F(lvlt(Lryet). To do 
this, we Ilse Wk+l as the dithering symbol and randomly consider options 
for tnlink until f(h*, m'ink, Wk+l) = hi, for some i E [k + 1, 21], and such that 
i E n, i.e., sllch that di-k, ... ,di = W. 
Step 4 We generat.e a prefix P of size i - k - 1 blocks such that P hashes from 
ho to one of the 2k hash values in the widest layer of our diamond. We 











seq Hence UI, U2, ... , (1;.-i-1' \Ve let D denote the chain of k message block 
and ditheriug symbol pairs leading from F(P) to h*. 
Step 5 We out.put the message 1\1' = PIIDllmlinkllrni+lll·· .llm21. 
III the event that i = 2', no message blocks of AI will be used in M'. The prefix 
sl'lected ill Step;) is 'i -l - 1 blocks long and AI' = PIIDIIIn11Ilk. 
Work 
In the \vorst case for the attacker, all factors of size k + 1 occur in d with the same 
frequency. This llleans that the probability of a (k + I)-letter subword being w 
is 1/ Fuctd(k + I), where }'uctd(k + 1) is the number of factors of length k + 1 
in the sequence d. In other words, the probability that i is an element of R in 
Step 3 is 1/ Fuctd(k + 1). This means that in the worst case, we will have to 
repeat the search for lfI{ ink Fuctd( k + 1) times because all factors of length (k + 1) 
arc equally likely, and thus each are w with probability 1/ Factd(k + 1). We will 
therefore need to consider at most 1/(1/ Fuctd(k + 1)) = Fuctrl(k + 1) candidates 
for w (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). Since we have to consider 2"-1 possibilities for 
I1llillk ea.ch time, this brings the total work for Step 3 to 
Building the diamond structure in Step 2 requires requires 2"/2+k /2+2 work (see 
Chapter 5, Section 6.4), and generating the prefix in Step 4 can be done with 
2"-k \vork. This brings the total work for the attack to 
Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
2"/2+lr/2+2 + Fuctd(k + 1) x 2"-1 + 2,,-k. 
In the case of Rivest's first proposal, the cost of the attack depends on the number 
Fact" (k + 1) of distinct factors of length (k + 1) occurring in the Keranen sequence 
K. This Humber is fairly low due to the rather regular structure of K. For k ::; 85 
it is shown in [ABF-t-08] that 












Fuct,,(k + 1) ~ 8k + 340. 
If {/. ::::; 3l, then t.he work required for Step 2 is roughly equal to the work required 
for Steps 3 and 4 respectively. Note that this approximation is more accurate 
if 1 <lnd I.: are of similar magnitude. If It » 31, then the work for the attack is 
dominated by Steps 3 and 4, and we can ignore the work required for Step 1. 
Assutrliug this to be the case, and by setting k = I - 3, the work for the attack 
on Rivest's first proposal is 
(8([ - 3) + 340) X 2,,-1 + 2,,-1+3 = (l + 40.5) x 2,,-1+3. 
This is much slIlaller than the expected brute-force amount of 2". 
In the case of RCP, the amount of work required is larger due to the higher 
nUlllber of distinct factors of length (k + 1) occurring in the dithering sequence 
used. This sequeuce d, derived horn the Ker~i.nen sequence by diluting it with a 
13-bit couuter (i.e., we only move on to the next symbol of the Keranen sequence 
when the 13-bit counter overfiows), has a cOlllplexity of 
Fadd(k) = 8k + 32760 
for all () ~ I < 213 . Therefore, the work required to run the attack on RCP is 
Again assuming that n » 31, and by setting k = l - 3, we obtain a complexity of 
roughly 
yet again beating a brute-force attack. 
\\'hat. is evident hom t.he above is that. the use of a diluting counter increases 
the cOlllplexity of the attack; ill the worst case we have more distinct factors of 











calldidate messages for w (sec ClJa,pter 2, section 2.,5). If we use the dithering se-
quenc(:~ given oy equation 7.1 for a co linter over t oits, then for t ~ k, the llluuber 
of factors of size k is }'([{;td( k) = :2 t , and the complexity of the attack becotlles 
(7.2) 
If we assume, as is common in practice, that the work is dominated by the second 
terlll of equation 7.2, then by setting t = i the complexity becomes 2" and we do 
no oetter than a brute force attack. This is essentially how HAIFA is constructed 
and is therefore immune to the Andreeva et al. attack. As a means of improving 
llivest's constl'llctions, the authors of [ABF+08] suggest the use of a dithering 
sequence of high complexity over a small alphabet. They prove the existence of 
an ahelian square-free sequeuce over six letters with (k + 1)-coIllplexity greater 
than 2"/'2, aml claim that the cost of an online attack (an attack that processes 
inputs in tum, without having the entire input available from the start) is roughly 
'2,,-'21/,.) fur k = 2[/3. 
Anclreeva et ai. [ABF+08] modify the attack to work on any dithering scheme 
over a small alphabet. This is done oy replacing the diamond with a more compli-
cated search structure know as a kite genemtvT. They make use of a time-memory 
tradeoff that helps to produce a second preimage with only a small amount of 
online computation; although there is an expensive precomputation stage. In the 
worst case, this modified attack finds a second preimage of a 21-block message ill 













III this dissertation we present a body of evidence that shows that the .tvlerkle-
Damgarcl hash fUllctiou design is not as secure as was previously hoped. More-
0\'('1', two of the most na t1ll'n! ways of ntternptillg t.o fix the eOllstruction have 
been showll llot to prevent the attacks. It is thus questiollable whether or not an 
iterative process is optimal for hash fUllction design, 
In response to the call for proposals by the NIST for a new hash algorithm, 
a team frolIl IvllT led by Ronald Rivest has recently submitted M06 [Riv08], 
1\1D6 is not based on the l\lerkle-Darngard construction for hash functions, but 
rathel', is a tree-based hash function. The input to the cOlllpression function of 
1\106 is very large, and the int.ermediate chaining values are 1024 bits long. The 
filletl output of .\:ID6 has a length of 512 bits, which means that it truncates the 
final chnining value computed when producing the hash value. 
Tn dah~, there has nnt been sufficient time for the cryptographic community 
tu review 1\106 in the hope of exposing the algorithm's potential weaknesses. It 
might be that there Hre llone, ill which CHse algorithms such as these could prove 
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Appendix A: BABI Source Code 
We pn~sullt the .Java source code for BABI. The method 'BigSqllmeRoot' was 
takell frotIl http://www.lIleniampal'k.curn/bigsql't.htlU. 






public class BASI { 
public static Biglnteger p,q,N; 
public static Scanner input; 
public static Biglnteger buffer; 
public static int msgBlockLength, chainVarLength, inputLength, 
initialMsgLength, lengthField; 
public static String msg, IV = "" ; 
public static Vector<String> msgBlocks; 
//============================================== 
/* This method checks for primality of the user input for p and 
q*/ 












Biglnteger curr = new Biglnteger(" 4"); 
while (!curr.isProbablePrime(10)) 
{ 
if (curr.toString().compareTo(" 4") != 0) 
{ 
System.out.println(" Number is not prime, please 
") re-enter ; 
} 






public static void calcBufferAndLengthsO 
{ 
BigSquareRoot app = new BigSquareRoot 0; 
BigDecimal sqrt = app.get(N); 
BigDecimal bufferDecimal = sqrt.round(new 
MathContext( I, RoundingMode. CEI LI N G)); 
buffer = bufFerDecimal.toBiglntegerO; 
BigDecimal NDivide2 = new BigDecimal(N).divide(new 
BigDecimal(" 2" )).round(new MathContext(l,RoundingMode.FLOOR)); 












inputLength = interval.bitLengthO-1; 
msgBlockLength = (int) Math.ceil(inputLength/2) + 1; 
chainVarLength = (int) Math.floor(inputLength/2) - 1; 
length Field = (msgBlockLength * 4); 
for (int i = 0; i < chainVarLength; i++) 
{ 
IV += "0"; 
} 
I/IV = .... ; 
System.out.println(" Length of chaining variable: .. + 
chainVarLength); 
System.out.println(" Length of message block: .. + msgBlockLength); 
1/================================================= 
//================================================= 
1* This method appends leading zeros onto bytes where necessary, adds 
padding if required and appends the length to the end of the message. * / 
public static String messageModification(byte[] msgBytes) 
{ 
Byte newS; 
String msgBits = .... ; 











for (int i = 0; i < msgBytes.length; i++) 
{ 
newS = (Byte)(msgBytes[?] ); 
System.out.print(lnteger.toHexString(newS.intValueO) + " "); 
} 
System .out.println(,," ); 
/ / Appends leading zeros if necessary. 
for (int i = 0; i < msgBytes.length; i++) 
{ 
newS = ( Byte) (msgBytes[?] ); / / Casts each byte to a byte object. 
} 
/ /Storing the binary representation of each byte in a string buffer. 
StringBuffer tempMsgBits = new 
StringBuffer( Integer. toBinaryString( newS. intValueO)); 
/ / Appending leading zeros. 
for (int j = 0; j < 8 - tempMsgBits.lengthO; j++) { 
tempMsgBits.insert(j, "0"); 
} 
msgBits += tempMsgBits.toStringO; /*Augmenting the message 
with the required number of zeros.* / 
/*Getting a binary representation of the message length and 
appending zeros so that it satisfies the length field. * / 
initialMsgLength = msgBits.lengthO; 
StringBuffer tempMsgLength = new 
StringBuffer(1 nteger.toBinaryStri ng( msgBits.lengthO)); 
int tempLength = tempMsgLength.lengthO; 



















if ( renlainder == 0) j*lf the message is a multiple of 
msgBlockLength, then no superficial padding is added, just the 
length. '" / 
msgBits += tempMsgLength.toString(); 
else j*Superficial padding is added, followed by the length. * / 
msgBits += "1" ; 
for (int i = 0; i < (msgBlockLength - remainder - 1); i++) 
{ 
msgBits += "0"; 
} 


















StringBuffet" tempMsg ::::: new StringBuffer(message); 
tempMsg.insert(O ... 0"); 
msgBlocks =- new Vector<String>O; 
String tempS = .... ; 
for (int i = 1; i < tempMsg.lengthO; i++) { 




tempS += tempMsg.charAt(i); 
msgBlocks.add( tempS); 
tempS = .... ; 
else 
{ 
tempS += tempMsg.charAt(i); 
} 
for (int i = 0; i < msgBlocks.size(); i++) { 
System.out.print(msgBlocks.elementAt(i) + .... ); 
} 
System .out. println("" ); 
//================================================ 
//================================================ 
public static String compressionFuction(String hiMinus1. String mi) 
{ 











int decimal Rep = 0; 
for (int i = 0; i < paramConcat.lengthO; i++) { 
if(param(oncat.cnarAt(i) == '1') 
{ 
decimalRep += Matn.pow(2.0, (paramConcat.lengthO - 1 - i)); 
} 
} 
long preCompressed = (long)Math.pow((double)(buffer.intValueO + 
decimaIRep), 2.0); 
preCompressed = preCompressed % N.intValueO; 
StringBuffer compressedValue = new 
Stri ngBuffer( Long. toBi naryStri ng( pre Compressed )); 
StringBuffer hi = new StringBuffer("" ); 
for (int i = compressedValue.lengthO-l; i 
> (compressedValue.lengthO-l-chainVarLength); i-) 
{ 
















public static String babiHashO 
{ 
String hi =-= IV, 
tempH = .... ; 
for (int i = 0; i < msgBlocks.size(); i++) 
{ 
} 
tempH = compressionFuction(hi, msgBlocks.elementAt(i)); 
hi ~ tempH; 







* @param args 
*/ 
public static void main(String[] args) { 
input = new Scanner(System.in); 
/ /Entering in p and q, and determining N. 
//================================ 
System.out.println(" Enter p: .. ); 
p = getPrime(); 
System.out.println(" Enter q: .. ); 













N "" p.multiply(q); 
!/======~============================ 
System.out.println(p + " " + q + " " + N); 
!*Calculating the buffer, the message block length and chaining 
value length."'! 
!/=================================== 
caleB ufferAnd Lengths(); 
!!==================================== 
msg = input.nextLine(); 
msg = 
while (msg.compareTo(" quit") != 0) 
{ 
} 
System.out.println(" Enter the message: "); 
msg = input.nextLine(); 
byte[] msgBytes = msg.getBytesO; 
storeMessage( messageModification( msgBytes)); 
System .out.println(babiHash 0); 











Appendix B: MD5 Collision Files 
Wc present the postscript code (ill ascii) for the documents D ami D' mentioned 
ill Chapter 5, Section 5.8. R2' is indicated in bold and the second instruction set 
is indicated in italics. 
D: 
% . PS-i".dc]:;e-: .:' 
%%-3cd.;.r .. d:"r .. q30x: -:, .:, 612 792 
l:hB&j"M::'U xe::A' !J7: 
F·,-@:T>1{IEm3::tS' [0 ::#xRmZ3N6: 
::nEZR:yk!-IuWev:l?-: 
YJ5sYH2t} 
,9#vT6- }o;:!rjkJ6:S::X:kHCtNa!....L '00:5I) (bB&j"l-C'U _xe::A' !J7: 
F"·'~:T>l! IElnS:: is' [0 ::#xRmZ3N6: 
::nEZR:yk!~IuWev:l?*: 
YJ5sYB2t} 
,9#v'r6- } 0;:' r} kJ6:S::X:kHCtNa!....L '00:5I) eq·: /T:r:-,e.::-?.orr.a." ::':'r.d::or.t ~'. 
~c~:e:~r .. 1: .!e=tfor~t 
3':":' 7 :c' f:"~O'o:letc! (Jt;.::.t.:.3. Ca'=.3a::; sha~.,r 
3:':' 62·:' F..o'Jeto (V:.a App:.a 1) sr.ow 
3),:' 66·:, ~o7etc· (?.oF..e, The ?.o~ar, !mp:':::-e) .::~.O"" 
2:, ~,,:,:. I':".oveto (l~lay, 22., 20~:') ::how 
25, -:5':' r.:c:,~."etc (!c t"r .. cF.~ ':"t }la;~ Conce::-r .. :) e:ho;.." 
2 5 -: 0·:) r.'.c'''.''etc 
U,::.ce Fa:ba:a f,..;:f:.::ed a:: t:-.e :::-eqc::..:::-er.,er.te of t::e ?.on:ar:. :::r..p':':::-ej 
25 3::':' rr.c'·,retc 
(':'!':te=r. :;:,C'.s.:.t:.or ... Sl::e ,\~la3 exce:::er:t at t~ar.3:at:"'!:;; '=Cr!':'tar .. :.r .. to he::- ga...:':) 
2~, 36::> r.-.C~le:to 
(r.at.:..v'e :ar..gt=.age, :ea=r.ed "'le:=r .:ap:"d':'1i, ar:d ;,to=J.:ed ;,.,t:.t:-.. con.s:.derab:e) 
=!:Q\v 
25 3" ':' F..c.'etc 
(:..::deper:.der:.ce ar.d cc'r:.f:.der.:ce.1 
25 3.J':' F.~c':tetcl 
(::e:::- tas:.c w::>::::).: ::.ab:..ts sc:ch as pur.cC'..;a::.ty, :.r:te:::-pe:::-sor.a: depo:::trner.t,) 
25 2:':- F..ovet::, 











25 ::. 6::' IT~C"!Aretc 
(: r~:.gr:.:,~" =~cOnlF.~er;j r..:=:ng her. :f you f ci ::.ke: tel d!'3Cf":~5 her attr:"bute3) 
I, :.r. P.','J!:e de t a:;':" , p:"eaee d':ll".· t r.eg.:,. tate to contact me. ! 











.;. .:, .:;- .. ; 'I':'.CVe. 't:::; 
(C"'.;.:...:.~.;.3 Cae?a.:) 
:. ':./:ri1'!i.=.s-.Kcr."~~.:1 fi~dfc:1~ 20 .s:::,alef~·:1t setfcnt 
3D::" 7C:'C' rn,;·v@:~ {I.-7uliu.s. Cae-sar) si:c't, 
3C'C' £8D ~~'i1~~C ('via Appi..; 1) .she .. " 
3C'O ~-t"C m.o .. ~,!'=:.:, (RCffi~, The RCr.id~ Empire) sh.c·;,~ 
(i.'1f::·rr:.a:,ic.."l at'·::,w!: ·:;AS"L.) 
.s.r.i..:::.~. 
(S 1.:: :::-~r!!ly,} 
s1:.:; ~~ 
.L -= L ~ '_I !!"i=··~:-e;; ~ 















l!:S£~: ""H:"' e xe:;"" t ./ ,n:: 
r .. ·df;s:'r>l ,::.r:~(~3::: S .. CO ::;yRrr~Z:-tI6': 
Y~S.3Y:!.2t:· 
,9#'.':6- }o;::~\kJE:S:::XJc:-!t:tNa I'O:o:SIj (hB&j"M:'U _xe::A' /J7: 
F,,·,1:T>.l.(::::C!im.3:: is' LO :::bbZ3N6: 
::llEZR:yl<./",:r:nWev: l?·: 
YJ-'5.sYH2t} 
,9#vT6- } o::! rl kJ6:S::XXHt:tNa! I' 00:5I) eq~ /T :r.:es-:Kor."ar. f :"r:dfont 20 
3ca:efor;t set font 
3«::' i/j,:' l":"~cvetc< (Jt;:':'U5. C.3.esa~) !:!"'.o~,,1' 
:;2<· 63 ,:. f:1o'.'etc, ("1:. a ;"pp:.a 'l) abo\,; 
3C:' 66,:· f:1C,'leto (:RoIl'.e, !he :;.ornan :'::rnp:.re) ;,ho>.' 
2: 5':'0 rr.o'.'eto (I·1a~r, 22, 2005) ar.en." 
2S 45(:' !:"C,7eto (:'0 i\,r,om:.t Hay Cor.cerr.:) 31",0'.,r 
25 32·) r.':o":~"etc 
,::;.nte:::r. I;oa:.t:.or:. Sr.1!: >.'(ig exce:.:..ent at trar;B':"at:.r:~ :::or;',ar. :.nto her ga;.;:) 
2.s :; 6:' f:".Cj't.'~ t~) 
ir,at:''le :ar~g'..1.age, :earr.ed ver~" rap.:..d':":l, and '.,c,rked '.,':"tl". cons:.de~ab:e) 
(.:.r:deper.der;ce and cor,!,:" der.ce. ) 
25 2:':' r.",~vetc! 
(co~~r..:rM:..cat=-or . .=:k':"'::3, and comp:et~r.q aes:.gr.ed ar .. d .3e:f-dete.:r.'l . .:..ned) 
5 26':' F..o";,"etcI 











2~ :6:· r.:c,-.l'etc 
(: :-.. .:.g!" .. :::~ :.-e=or;J"f~er.d ::':':::-:"::0' :--.. e.:.. :f :.lO~! d ::.ke: tC> d.=-3C~5S he.!:" at~!".:.bute!:) 
n n".o!Ce :::leta::..':", p:'ea.s,;;, don' t he:.<':"cate to contact r.>.e. i 











3DD 7l)C I!;.~·~~t~; (.)'u~iu$. C~eSar) sh.~r.~ 
30D e-S-O r.r.:::ve=::c {Via Appia l) sh.cv 
300' £60 ~:::·ve~·=- (R.::;ITt=l The Rc.man Eopir:) sho~" 
25 5eo !:i,=,"~re=~ tl·!ay, 22, 2005) sh~ti' 
(Ali=~ :albale ~s ·;71ve:; full a::=ess !::~ .. !..l."!' ~.:nfid=::tial dna se::r·==J 
s .. ~~.:-;.~ 
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